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United States Accounting Standards - Rules
or Principles?
The Devil Is Not in the Details
MATrHEW A. MELONE*
The proliferation of corporate scandals in the past several years has
swept up individuals and institutions in a wave of negative publicity and
litigation. Corporate executives, Wall Street investment banks, indepen-
dent auditors, law firms, and commercial banks have all been the subject
of harsh criticism and, in some cases, significant financial settlements or
bankruptcy proceedings. With the remarkable demise of Arthur Ander-
sen as a result of its role in the vast Enron fraud, much criticism has
been directed toward independent auditors. In response, Congress
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.' The Act has made significant
changes to the regulation of independent auditors and modestly altered
the auditor-client relationship.2
Less noticed, however, was a provision in the legislation dealing
with accounting standards. Section 108(d)(1) of the Act, resurrecting an
issue that has been subject to debate for some time, orders the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to "conduct a study on the adoption
by the U.S. financial reporting system of a principles-based accounting
system."3 Critics of the present state of U.S. accounting standards have
taken the opportunity provided by the recent scandals to allege that the
accounting standards were significant contributors to the making of such
scandals.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the recent accounting
reform proposals put forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) and the SEC. Part II describes the current U.S. accounting stan-
dards-setting process. Part III analyzes the arguments in support of
reform and concludes that such proposals are misguided for numerous
reasons. The present system functions reasonably well, and widespread
adoption of principles-based standards will do little to alleviate the
alleged defects in the current system. Moreover, the existing audit
* Associate Professor of Law, Lehigh University Department of Finance & Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the Act].
2. See infra notes 238-51 and accompanying text.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 108(d)(1)(A).
1161
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
model is inadequate to support the wholesale adoption of such
principles.
I. CALLS FOR REFORM
Critics assert that U.S. accounting standards, as a result of inordi-
nate complexity and detail, have made it increasingly difficult for
accounting professionals to fully understand and master these standards.
Moreover, the emphasis that such standards place on rule-driven imple-
mentation guidance have allowed clever professionals to engineer trans-
actions that fall safely within their literal scope yet circumvent the intent
and purpose of the rules. Harvey Pitt, then chairman of the SEC,
asserted:
Much of the FASB's recent guidance has become rule-driven and
complex. The areas of derivatives and securitizations are examples.
The emphasis on detailed rules instead of broad principles has con-
tributed to delays in issuing timely guidance. Additionally, because
the standards are developed based on rules, not broad principles, they
are insufficiently flexible to accommodate future developments in the
marketplace. This has resulted in accounting for unanticipated trans-
actions that is less transparent and less consistent with basic underly-
ing principles that should apply. The development of rule-based
accounting standards has resulted in the employment of financial
engineering techniques designed solely to achieve accounting objec-
tives rather than achieve economic objectives.4
The FASB has issued a proposal for the development of a princi-
ples-based approach to standard setting.5 In the proposal, the FASB
asserts that the detail and complexity that presently exist have resulted
from several factors. First, the numerous existing exceptions to the stan-
dards increase the level of detail and complexity of the standards. 6
Moreover, such exceptions often result in the promulgation of "bright-
lines" and "on-off' switches that elevate the form of the transaction over
its substance.7 Many of the exceptions are "demand-driven." 8 For
example, application exceptions are provided to achieve a desired
accounting result such as limiting earnings volatility. Transition excep-
4. PROPOSAL: PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH TO U.S. STANDARD SETTING 2 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 2002), available at http://www.fasb.org/proposals/index.shtml (quoting Harvey Pitt
in testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on March
21, 2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH].
5. Id at 1. More than three years earlier a former chairman of the FASB argued that
accounting standards were too complex. See Dennis R. Beresford, It's Time to Simplify
Accounting Standards, J. ACCT., Mar. 1999, at 65.
6. PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH, supra note 4, at 2-3.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 2.
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tions are provided to mitigate the effects of adopting a new standard.9
A second reason for the proliferation of accounting guidance is to
ensure accounting comparability among entities.' ° To some extent, the
numerous exceptions that are often provided appear to conflict with the
stated objective of comparability. Third, detailed guidance is also
sought as a form of insurance against lawsuits and regulatory second-
guessing. Compliance with rules is perceived to provide a defense
against allegations of negligence or fraud." Finally, increasingly com-
plex standards are a natural response to increasingly complex business
practices." A more cynical view, and one that the FASB would hardly
be expected to put forth, is that detailed guidance reduces the ability of
companies to "shop" accounting firms in order to obtain its preferred
accounting treatment.
13
The FASB's proposal calls for two broad reforms. First, few, if
any, exceptions to the standards would be provided.' 4 Second, less
interpretive and implementation guidance would be forthcoming.1
5
9. Exceptions to the standards generally fall within one of three categories. Scope exceptions
are provided in order for certain transactions to be accounted for under other standards. Id. at 2-3.
10. The Association of Investment Management and Research, an organization of more than
40,000 investment professionals, in a letter to Financial Accounting Standards Board, stated that,
in addition to information that reflects reality, comparability of financial information from firm to
firm is critical to the sound operation of U.S. capital markets. See id., at 1 (quoting from the
aforementioned letter). Justice Scalia places importance in the predictability of law. In his view, it
is difficult to demonstrate the inconsistency of two opinions based upon a "totality of
circumstances." In his view, rules serve as a means of judicial restraint. See Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80 (1989).
11. PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH, supra note 4. Rigorous SEC enforcement has also
contributed to the demand by accounting professionals for specific and detailed rules. See
generally Stephen A. Zeff, A Perspective on the U.S. Public/Private-Sector Approach to the
Regulation of Financial Reporting, 9 Accr. HORIZONS 52 (1995) (citing DAVID SOLOMONS,
MAKING ACCOUNTING POLICY: THE QUEST FOR CREDIBILITY IN FINANCIAL REPORTING (1986)).
12. Derivatives are a case in point. Accounting standards for derivatives have been criticized
as unduly burdensome. See generally ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING
ACTIVITIES, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 133 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1998). In fact, the FASB has created a Derivatives Implementation Group whose
sole purpose is to offer implementation guidance in accounting for such activities. See infra notes
41-42 and accompanying text. Derivative products are extremely complex and have caused
consternation among regulators, managers, and standard setters for years. See, e.g., Henry Sender,
At Freddie, A Full House of Derivatives, WALL. ST. J., June 20, 2003, at C-I (describing the
extent of Freddie Mac's derivative positions); Jonathan Weil, Volatility at Fannie, Freddie? The
Two Are Firm in Denial, WALL. ST. J. June 20, 2003, at C1 (describing the impact of accounting
standards on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two largest mortgage financiers in the world).
Difficulties in managing the complexity of derivatives have been known for some time. Bankers
Trust Co. was sued in 1994 by both Procter & Gamble Co. and Gibson Greetings, Inc. over losses
that resulted from derivative transactions marketed and sold by Bankers Trust. See Saul Hansell,
P.&G. Sues Bankers Trust over Swap Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at Dl.
13. See Zeff, supra note 11, at 65.
14. PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH, supra note 4, at 7-8.
15. Id. at 8-9.
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These reforms would result in increased reliance on the professional
judgment of accounting professionals. The FASB would also strengthen
the existing conceptual foundation on which the standards rest and pos-
sibly provide "fair and true override" provisions in the standards. 16 To a
certain extent, the FASB proposal would move accounting standard set-
ting in the United States closer to international standards.17
Pursuant to section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,'8 the SEC in
July 2003 submitted a study on the adoption of a principles-based
accounting system to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs and to the House Committee on Financial Services. 9 The
study recommends that U.S. accounting standards move toward a princi-
ples-based regime. The study contrasts a principles-based regime with
both a rule-based and principles-only approach to accounting standard
setting.20 According to the SEC, a rule-based standard is characterized
by bright-line tests, multiple exceptions, a high level of detail, and inter-
nal inconsistencies. 2' A principles-only standard is one that is broad-
based but offers little, if any, operational guidance. 22 A principles-based
16. Id. at 5-7. A "fair and true override" is a mechanism that allows for accounting standards
to be overridden if their application fails to reflect to substance of the transaction in question.
International accounting standards commonly provide such a mechanism.
17. International Accounting Standards refer to thirty core standards promulgated by the
International Accounting Standards Committee, a body that was formed in 1973 with professional
representation from ten countries that has since expanded to include ninety-one countries. On
May 17, 2000, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, of which the SEC is a
prominent member, recommended that its members adopt the International Accounting Standards.
To date, the SEC has not accepted the international standards and continues to require foreign
issuers to reconcile financial statements prepared in accordance with international standards to
U.S. accounting standards. See generally Maureen Peyton King, Note, The SEC's (Changing?)
Stance on IAS, 27 BROOK J. INT'L L. 315 (2001). The FASB has undertaken steps to further the
goal of converging U.S. standards with international standards. See Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd., Converging with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), at http://
www.fasb.org/intl/convergenceiasb.shtrnl (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). The FASB has also issued
a comprehensive study comparing U.S. and international standards. See IASC - U.S.
COMPARISON REPORT: A REPORT ON THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IASC
STANDARDS AND U.S. GAAP (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., 2d. ed. 1999).
18. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 108(d)(1)(A).
19. STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(d) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE
ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCIPLES-BASED
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM (U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/principlesbasedstand.htm [hereinafter Study Pursuant to Section 108(d)].
20. The report states that current accounting standards include rule-based, principles-based,
and principles-only standards. See id. at 24-27.
21. Id. at 13.
22. Id. at 14. The report cites two examples of principles-only standards: impairment of long-
lived assets and the historical cost model of recording depreciable assets. The report asserts that
these standards establish a basic principle but fail to provide sufficient guidance for the
application of judgment. Id. at 26.
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standard, in contrast, attempts to bridge these two extremes by adopting
an "objectives-oriented" process.
Objectives-oriented standards are drafted in accordance with objec-
tives set by an overarching, coherent conceptual framework and eschew
exceptions and bright-line tests.23 Moreover, such standards clearly
articulate the class of transactions to which they apply and contain suffi-
cient detailed guidance to provide practitioners with a structure to aid in
their implementation.24 The study, however, does not state at what point
implementation guidance results in the high level of detail for which
rules-based standards are criticized. It appears the SEC would welcome
some, but not too much, exercise of professional judgment. The study
also recommends that standards be established under a balance sheet
framework in contrast to a revenue-expense framework and recommends
against the promulgation of "true and fair" override provisions.2 ' By
making the distinction between principles-only and principles-based
standards and opposing "true and fair" override provisions, the SEC
appears to be less confident than the FASB in the ability of accountants
to exercise professional judgment.
II. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Private Sector Standard Setting
U.S. accounting standards are, for the most part, established by the
private sector.26 From 1939 to 1973 the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) or its predecessor took the lead in the pro-
mulgation of accounting standards. 27 From 1939 to 1959, the Commit-
23. Id. at 13.
24. Id. Several standards are categorized by the report as principles-based. Among the more
salient characteristics of these standards are the absence of "bright-line tests," few if any scope
restrictions, and adequate implementation guidance. See id. at 25-26.
25. Id. at 27-29, 34. A balance sheet approach to standard setting requires that primacy be
given to identifying the assets and liabilities affected by the standard. Net income consequences
flow residually from the changes to assets and liabilities during the period in question. A revenue-
expense approach would place primary emphasis on identifying the revenue and expense accounts
affected with the residual effects flowing to the balance sheet. Although in theory both
approaches should yield the same result, the study concludes that focus on revenue and expenses
invariably leads to standards that are either over- or under-inclusive. I agree with the SEC
position. It is conceptually cleaner to focus on the balance sheet because such items are
determined at one point in time.
26. But see infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the role of the SEC
and Congress in the promulgation of accounting standards).
27. The AICPA is the largest trade group representing certified public accountants and
continues to retain a role, albeit diminished, in the establishment of accounting standards. See
infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. The AICPA has a more central role in the
establishment of auditing standards - a role that has been substantially diminished by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
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tee on Accounting Procedure and the Committee on Terminology,
composed of public accountants and academics, issued fifty-one
Accounting Research Bulletins. 8
In 1959, the AICPA established the Accounting Principles Board to
replace the Committees on Accounting Procedure and Terminology.2 9
Like its predecessor committees, the Accounting Principles Board was
composed of part-time members although its membership, with repre-
sentation from industry and the financial community, possessed a more
diverse background. Authoritative pronouncements, in the form of
thirty-one opinions, were issued by the Accounting Principles Board
between 1959 and 1973.30
In 1973 the FASB, composed of seven full-time members, was cre-
ated. Unlike the Accounting Principles Board or its predecessors, the
FASB is independent of any other business, industry, or trade organiza-
tion.31 The FASB establishes accounting standards in myriad fashions,
the most authoritative of which is through the issuance of Statements of
Financial Accounting Standards. Prior to its issuance, a Statement is
subject to rigorous due process. After reaching a conclusion on an issue,
the FASB issues an Exposure Draft setting forth proposed standards of
financial accounting and reporting, background information, effective
dates, and transition rules.32 Public comment is then solicited, and at the
28. These committees were established by the American Institute of Accountants (AIA),
which was renamed the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in 1957. At that time,
the committees became part of the AICPA. In 1953, the first forty-two of the Accounting
Research Bulletins were revised, restated, or withdrawn with the issuance of Accounting Research
Bulletin No. 43. See RESTATEMENT AND REVISION OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS,
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 43 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1953). Eight
of the forty-two Accounting Research Bulletins were issued by the Committee on Terminology
and were not included in the restatement and revision project that culminated in the issuance of
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43. The Committee on Terminology also issued four
Accounting Terminology Bulletins.
29. At its first meeting, the Accounting Principles Board approved a resolution that the
Accounting Research Bulletins and Accounting Terminology Bulletins issued by the Committee
on Procedure and Committee on Terminology should be considered as continuing with the same
force and degree of authority as before. See 3 ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 4 (2002-03).
30. The AICPA also issued numerous Accounting Interpretations, the purpose of which was
to provide timely guidance and clarification on accounting issues and practices without the formal
procedures required for the issuance of Opinions. These pronouncements were issued by the
AICPA staff and were not pronouncements of the Accounting Principles Board. See id. (reprinting
AICPA Notice Regarding AICPA Accounting Interpretations). See infra notes 69-76 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the hierarchy of accounting pronouncements.
31. FASB board members are selected by the Financial Accounting Foundation, a nonprofit
corporation that provides funding for and general oversight of the FASB. The Board of Trustees
of the Financial Accounting Foundation is composed of members from eight constituent
organizations. See FASB Facts, available at http://www.fasb.org/facts (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
32. See How Topics Are Added to the FASB's Technical Agenda, available at http://
www.fasb.org/facts/tech-agenda.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
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end of the exposure period and final deliberation by the FASB, a State-
ment is issued.33 As of June 1, 2003, the FASB has issued 150 State-
ments of Financial Accounting Standards.34
The FASB also issues Interpretations. These pronouncements gen-
erally deal with implementation issues that arise under existing stan-
dards.3 5 Additional guidance is issued by the staff of the FASB in the
form of Technical Bulletins. In general, Technical Bulletins are issued
when the guidance provided is not expected to cause a major change in
practice for a significant number of entities and such guidance will not
conflict with a broad fundamental principle or create a novel accounting
practice. 36 Technical Bulletins are issued with less extensive due pro-
cess although they are first issued in proposed form and subject to public
comment.37
In 1984, the FASB, in an effort to more timely identify, discuss,
and resolve financial accounting issues within the existing authoritative
framework, formed the Emerging Issues Task Force.38  This group,
through consensus positions, promulgates implementation guidance to
reduce diversity in practice. In many cases the issues addressed by the
Emerging Issues Task Force are extremely narrow.39 In other cases the
Task Force addressed issues that, due to technological changes or other
factors, have reached a critical mass and that have resulted in diverse
positions.4° In 1998, the FASB created the Derivatives Implementation
33. Id.
34. See Summaries and Status of All FASB Statements, available at http://www.fasb.org/st/
(last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
35. FASB Interpretations may be issued for Accounting Principles Board Opinions as well as
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards. See ACCOUNTING CHANGES RELATED TO THE
COST OF INVENTORY, INTERPRETATION No. 1 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1974) (interpreting
APB Opinion No. 20).
36. See generally PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF FASB TECHNICAL BULLETINS AND PROCEDURES
FOR ISSUANCE, TECHNICAL BULLETIN 79-1 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1984).
37. Id.
38. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF): General
Information, at http://www.fasb.org/eitf/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). The FASB's
Director of Technical Application and Implementation Activities chairs the task force. The Chief
Accountant of the SEC and the chairperson of the Accounting Standards Executive Committee of
the AICPA have observer status. See id.
39. See, e.g., SALES OF PUT OPTIONS ON ISSUER'S STOCK THAT REQUIRE OR PERMIT CASH
SETTLEMENT, EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE ISSUE No. 96-1 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
1996); REVENUE RECOGNITION ON EQUIPMENT SOLD AND SUBSEQUENTLY REPURCHASED SUBJECT
TO AN OPERATING LEASE, EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE No. 95-4 (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd. 1995).
40. See, e.g., REPORTING REVENUE GROSS AS A PRINCIPAL VERSUS NET AS AN AGENT,
EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE ISSUE No. 99-19 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1999);
ACCOUNTING FOR ADVERTISING BARTER TRANSACTIONS, EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE ISSUE
No. 99-17 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1999). Both of these consensus issues arose from the
proliferation of Internet based transactions. The first referenced consensus issue addressed the
11672004]
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Group to assist the FASB in answering questions faced by companies
when they began implementing Statement of Accounting Standards No.
133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities.41
This group is patterned after the Emerging Issues Task Force with cer-
tain differences.42
The staff of the FASB also issues Staff Implementation Guides that
address questions considered to have widespread relevance. These
Guides are published in question and answer format. In February 2003,
the FASB also instituted a new form of application guidance, the FASB
Staff Position. The purpose of the Staff Position is to inform the
accounting and financial community of the accounting or reporting treat-
ment of transactions that have widespread relevance and for which the
FASB staff believes there is a single appropriate resolution. This gui-
dance is issued in proposed form and posted on the FASB website dur-
ing a comment period after which it is posted in final form.
4 3
In 1978, the FASB began to establish a more formal foundational
underpinning for the establishment of accounting standards with the
issuance of Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1, Objec-
tives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises.4 Subsequently,
six additional Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts were issued,
the last of which was issued in 2000.45 These statements are intended to
accounting of exchanges of advertising on websites. The second referenced consensus issue
addressed the accounting for the sale of goods via the Internet through independent warehouses.
41. STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 133, ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE
INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING AcTrrvTIEs (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1998).
42. The Derivatives Implementation Group is unique in that it has been formed prior to the
effective date of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard for which it was created. The
statement became effective for all fiscal quarters of all fiscal years beginning after June 15, 1999.
Id. § 48. Moreover, unlike the Emerging Issues Task Force, no formal voting process is in force
to establish a consensus on an issue. Instead, the chair of the group has the responsibility to
identify a consensus position on an issue. Tentative positions are posted on FASB's website and,
once cleared by the FASB, they become part of a FASB staff implementation guide in question
and answer format. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Derivatives Implementation Group, at
http://www.fasb.org/derivatives/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
43. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Staff Positions (FSP), at http://www.fasb.org/
fasb.staff.positions/final-fsp.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). As of June 14, 2003 two FASB
Staff Positions have been issued. See ACCOUNTING FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT
INDEMNIFICATIONS UNDER FASB INTERPRETATION No. 45, GUARANTOR'S ACCOUNTING AND
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR GUARANTEES, INCLUDING INDIRECT GUARANTEES OF
INDEBTEDNESS OF OTHER, STAFF POSITION (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., June 11, 2003);
ACCOUNTING FOR ACCRUED INTEREST RECEIVABLES UNDER FASB STATEMENT No. 140,
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF
LIABILITIES, Staff Position (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., April 14, 2003).
44. STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 1, OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL
REPORTING BY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1978).
45. See QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION, STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 2 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1980); ELEMENTS OF
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
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establish objectives and concepts that the FASB itself will use in devel-
oping standards. They are non-authoritative and do not establish gener-
ally accepted accounting principles.46 The FASB intended itself as the
most direct beneficiary of the guidance provided by these statements,
principally as tools for resolving issues.
The AICPA, despite the demise of the Accounting Principles Board
in 1973, continues to have a role in the promulgation of accounting stan-
dards.47 After the FASB replaced the Accounting Principles Board in
1973, the AICPA formed the Accounting Standards Executive Commit-
tee to serve as the AICPA's senior technical committee on accounting
matters. This committee issues letters of comment and public state-
ments concerning accounting issues. This committee will often take up
certain narrow issues for resolution under FASB oversight. The AICPA
Accounting Standards Team staffs the committee and issues AICPA
Statements of Position, Accounting and Auditing Guides, and Practice
Bulletins.48
CONCEPTS No. 3 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1980); OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY
NONBUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 4 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1980); RECOGNTON AND MEASUREMENT IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 5 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1984); ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: A REPLACEMENT OF
FASB CONCEPTS STATEMENT No. 3 (INcoRPORATING AN AMENDMENT OF FASB CONCEPTS
STATEMENT No. 2), STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AcCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 6 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1985); USING CASH FLOW INFORMATION AND PRESENT VALUE IN ACCOUNTING
MEASUREMENTS, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 7 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 2000). The sixth concept statement superceded the third. Therefore, six Statements
of Financial Accounting Concepts are currently in force.
46. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
47. The AICPA is the primary private sector provider of auditing standards. See infra notes
64-66, 242-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the AICPA's role in setting auditing
standards and the increased public sector role as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
48. Statements of Position provide guidance on financial accounting and reporting matters,
typically for specialized transactions or industries, which are not otherwise covered in other
authoritative literature. See, e.g., ACCOUNTING BY PRODUCERS OR DISTRIBUTORS OF FILMS,
STATEMENT OF POSITION 00-2 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2000); REPORTING ON THE
COSTS OF START-UP AcTIVIriEs, STATEMENT OF POSITION 98-5 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1998); REPORTING ON ADVERTISING COSTS, STATEMENT OF POSITION 93-7 (Am. Inst.
of Certified Pub. Accountants 1993). Audit and Accounting Guides provide guidance to auditors
in examining and reporting on financial statements. Audit and Accounting Guides also provide
guidance to auditors and accountants on an industry-wide basis. For example, Audit and
Accounting Guides have been issued for the casino, airline, insurance, health care, and
construction industries. Statements of Position and Accounting and Audit Guides that contain
auditing guidance must be approved by the Director and Chair of the AICPA's Auditing Standards
Board. Practice Bulletins address narrow reporting or accounting issues. For example, among the
Practice Bulletins that have been issued are those that provide guidance on foreign debt-equity
swaps, direct response advertising, and accounting by Limited Liability Companies and Limited
Liability Partnerships. Statements of Position and Accounting and Auditing Guides are
considered to be of equal authoritative weight and are the most authoritative guidance issued by
the AICPA with respect to accounting standards. Practice Bulletins, although considered
2004] 1169
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B. Public Sector Input
The establishment of accounting standards is not left exclusively to
the private sector. The SEC possesses the statutory authority to establish
financial accounting and reporting standards for public companies.49
The SEC has generally relied on the private sector for the establishment
of accounting principles.50 The SEC does, however, guide the form and
substance of disclosure of financial information through Regulation S-X,
which sets forth rules for preparation of SEC filings and audited finan-
cial statements required by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.1
In addition, from 1937 to 1982, the SEC issued 307 Accounting
Series Releases containing the SEC's position on accounting and audit-
ing matters.5 In 1982, Accounting Series Releases were replaced by
Financial Reporting Releases and Accounting and Auditing Enforce-
ment Releases, the latter communicating enforcement actions taken
against auditors.53 In 1975, the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance
and Office of the Chief Accountant began issuing Staff Accounting Bul-
letins. These pronouncements reflect the views of the SEC staff regard-
ing accounting related disclosure practices but are not considered rules
of the SEC nor are they officially approved by the SEC.54 Oftentimes,
the requirements of SEC pronouncements create redundancies with pri-
vate sector requirements.55
authoritative, are ranked below both Statements of Position and Accounting and Auditing Guides
in the standards hierarchy. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. For a listing of AICPA
Statements of Position, Accounting and Auditing Guides, and Practice Bulletins, see 3
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, supra note 29.
49. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were enacted by
Congress in the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash, the former primarily regulating
registration disclosure requirements for companies contemplating a public offering of securities
and the latter regulates the periodic reporting of companies whose securities are publicly traded.
The SEC has broad authority under these statutes to regulate the disclosure of financial and
accounting information. See generally James D. Redwood, Qualitative Materiality Under SEC
Proxy Rules and the Fifth Amendment: A Disclosure Accident Waiting to Happen or Two Ships
Passing in the Night?, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 315, 322 (1992) (describing the broad authority of the
SEC to promulgate disclosure rules).
50. In 1973, the SEC publicly announced, in Accounting Series Release No. 150, that the
standards promulgated by the FASB will be considered to have substantial authoritative support.
Prior to the issuance of this release, the policy had never been publicly enunciated. For a general
discussion of the SEC's approach to the setting of accounting standards, see Zeff, supra note 11.
See also Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax
Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 35, 144-48 (2003).
51. See 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2003).
52. See Zeff, supra note 11, at 63.
53. Id.
54. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Selected Staff Accounting Bulletins, at http://
www.sec.gov/interps/account.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2004); see also Zeff, supra note 13, at 56.
55. The Business Reporting Research Project, sponsored by the FASB, issued a report
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The SEC also provides significant input to the private sector stan-
dard setters. SEC staff members communicate frequently with the staffs
of the FASB and AICPA. The Chief Accountant of the SEC attends the
quarterly meetings of FASB's Advisory Council and is an observer at
meetings of the Emerging Issues Task Force. 6 Occasionally, the SEC
will request that a standard setting body provide guidance on an issue.
For example, the SEC Chief Accountant, in a 1999 letter to the FASB
Director of Research and Technical Activities, provided a list of issues
that the SEC believed should be addressed by the Emerging Issues Task
Force. 7 Guidance was subsequently provided for several of the issues
specified in the letter .5  Moreover, many SEC Chief Accountants have
occupied important standards-setting positions in the private sector. 9
On occasion, accounting standards capture the attention of Con-
gress, generally when influential constituencies are sufficiently opposed
to a proposed accounting standard. The two most noteworthy examples
of congressional interference with accounting standards are with respect
to the accounting for the investment tax credit and the issuance of com-
pensatory stock options. 60 The accounting for the issuance of compen-
satory stock options remains a controversial subject and is discussed
below. 6'
The investment tax credit, enacted during the Kennedy administra-
identifying the redundancies that exist between generally accepted accounting principles and SEC
disclosure requirements. GAAP-SEC DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd., Mar. 6, 2001), available at http://www.fasb.org/brrp/brrp3.shtml.
56. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See also Luppino, supra note 54, at 140-42;
Zeff, supra note 13. The Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council was formed in 1973
and its primary function is to advise the FASB on issues on the FASB's agenda and suggest
possible new agenda items. Its members are drawn primarily from the executives in industry,
senior partners of public accounting firms, and academia. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.,
Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council, at http://www.fasb.org/fasac/ (last visited Feb.
8, 2004).
57. See Thomas J. Phillips Jr. et al., The Right Way to Recognize Revenue, J. AcCT, June
2001, at 39 (describing a host of revenue recognition issues, many of which related to internet
transactions).
58. Id at 41.
59. The current chief accountant of the SEC, Donald Nicolaisen, was a senior partner at
PricewaterhouseCoopers. See Deborah Solomon, SEC Appoints Nicolaisen to be Chief
Accountant, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2003, at A3.
60. Legislation may also indirectly influence the application of accounting standards. For
example, in order to apply the last-in, first-out method of accounting for inventories for tax
purposes, a taxpayer must also use that method for financial statement purposes. See I.R.C.
§ 472(c) (2002). Political pressure on accounting standard setters is not solely a U.S.
phenomenon. See Floyd Norris, Showdown Looms in Europe Over Proposals on Accounting,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2003, at Cl (describing the political pressure applied by various European
leaders on the International Accounting Standards Board with respect to proposals that would
require fair market value accounting for derivatives).
61. See infra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
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tion, provided taxpayers with a tax credit based on a percentage of quali-
fied investments acquired, in an attempt to spur economic activity. The
Accounting Principles Board, responsible for setting standards at that
time, concluded that the tax credit should be recognized periodically
over the life of the asset to which the credit applied.62 This generated
significant resistance within the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon adminis-
trations because such accounting treatment, administration officials
believed, would diminish the incentive to acquire qualified property,
thereby working at cross-purposes with the credit. Finally, after years of
informal pressure, the Nixon administration was able to obtain congres-
sional action to stifle the implementation of the accounting standard.63
C. Auditing Standards
Auditing standards play a significant role in determining whether
the application of accounting principles is appropriate for a particular
transaction. The AICPA is the primary private sector promulgator of
auditing standards through its Auditing Standards Board.' This fifteen-
member body establishes the rules for how an auditor determines
whether information reported in financial statements is reasonable and
whether it conforms to generally accepted accounting principles. The
Auditing Standards Board, in establishing auditing standards, has a role
analogous to that of the FASB in determining accounting standards.
Audit standards are promulgated in Statements on Auditing Standards,
62. See ACCOUNTING FOR THE "INVESTMENT CREDIT," ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
OPINION No. 2 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1962). The opinion treated the
investment credit as a reduction in the cost of the acquired asset for which the credit was
generated. Consequently, the tax benefit of the credit would be recognized into income over the
life of the asset. The alternative favored by the various administrations would account for the
benefit of the tax credit in the year it was generated.
63. Revenue Act of 1971, § 101(c), Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 499 (1971) (providing that
no taxpayer shall be required to use any particular method to account for the investment tax
credit).
64. The Auditing Standards Board was formed in 1978 to succeed the AICPA's Auditing
Standards Executive Committee. The first auditing standards were issued in 1939 by the
American Institute of Accountants, the predecessor of the AICPA. The audit profession has been
principally self-regulated. A system of mandatory peer review was instituted by the AICPA in
1977. A Public Oversight Board was formed in 1977 to oversee the peer review process, quality
control processes, and the Auditing Standards Board. The Public Oversight Board, an
independent body with its own board, budget, and staff, also performed field reviews of all CPA
firms with 30 or more SEC clients and occasional reviews of other CPA firms. This body was
subject to severe criticism in the wake of the recent accounting and auditing scandals, particularly
the Enron and Arthur Andersen implosions. See American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, A
Brief History of Self-Regulation, at www.aicpa.org/info/regulation02.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2004). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has dramatically altered the regulatory landscape of the
accounting and auditing professions with the establishment of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, sounding the death knell for the Public Oversight Board. See infra notes 242-45
and accompanying text.
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and are subject to due process akin to that applicable to the issuance of
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards. 65 Additional guidance is
provided by Interpretations of Statements on Auditing Standards, State-
ments of Position, and Accounting and Audit Guides.6 6
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1 requires an auditor who has
audited financial statements in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards to opine whether those statements are presented fairly
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, a term that
includes rules, procedures, and conventions that define accepted
accounting practice at a given time.67 Prior to 1992, Statements of
Financial Accounting Standards issued by the FASB, Opinions of the
Accounting Principles Board, and Accounting Research Bulletins issued
by the AICPA were the highest authoritative sources for determining
whether an accounting practice was generally accepted. All other
sources were of equally lesser, weight in making such a determination.
In 1992, the Auditing Standards Board issued Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 69, which provides a hierarchal guide for determining
generally accepted accounting principles.
68
Official pronouncements promulgated by a body designated by the
AICPA, pursuant to Rule 203 of the AICPA Code of Professional Con-
duct, are considered the most authoritative form of guidance. 69 Applica-
tion of accounting principles specified in such pronouncements, termed
Category A pronouncements, are deemed to almost always result in the
fair presentation of financial position, results of operations, and cash
65. The Auditing Standards Board also issued Statements on Standards for Attestation
Engagements and Statements on Quality Control Standards. The AICPA Code of Conduct
requires auditors to abide by such standards. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT §202, Rule
202 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988).
66. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
67. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, STATEMENT ON AUDITING
STANDARDS No. 1, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 1 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1972). The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct provides that generally an auditor
should not express an unqualified opinion on financial statements if such statements contain a
material departure from pronouncements by bodies designated by the AICPA to establish
accounting principles. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 65, § 203, Rule 203.
See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term "fairly" and whether
such term provides auditors the opportunity to assess substance over form issues or otherwise
challenge mechanical application of rules. Note that auditors may opine on financial statements
prepared in accordance with requirements that differ from generally accepted accounting practice,
such as regulatory agency requirements. In such cases, auditors are to comply with other
requirements. See RESTRICTING THE USE OF AN AUDITOR'S REPORT, STATEMENT ON AUDITING
STANDARDS No. 87 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1998).
68. THE MEANING OF PRESENT FAIRLY IN CONFORMITY WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES IN THE INDEPENDENT AUDITORS REPORT, STATEMENT ON AUDITING
STANDARDS No. 69 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1992).
69. Id. § 69.05.
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flows. 70 Four types of pronouncements are included in this category:
FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards; FASB Interpreta-
tions of Statements of Financial Accounting Standards; Accounting
Principles Board Opinions; and AICPA Accounting Research
Bulletins.71
If guidance is not forthcoming from a Category A source, then gui-
dance is to be sought, successively, from sources in categories B through
D.72 Category B sources are FASB Technical Bulletins, AICPA Audit
and Accounting Guides, and AICPA Statements of Position.73 Category
C pronouncements are AICPA Practice Bulletins and Consensus Posi-
tions of the FASB Emerging Issues Task Force.74 Finally, Category D
pronouncements include AICPA accounting interpretations and imple-
mentation guides, question and answer guidance published by the FASB
staff, and practices that are widely recognized and prevalent, either gen-
erally or in the industry. With respect to Category D, Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 69 provides no guidance on how the determina-
tion is to be made whether a practice is widely recognized and prevalent
in general or within a particular industry.
In the event guidance cannot be found in any of the above refer-
enced sources, other material may be considered. Such other material,
depending on the particular circumstances, the specificity of the gui-
dance, and the reputation of the issuer or author, includes pronounce-
ments of regulatory agencies and professional associations, textbooks,
and articles. 76 FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts may
be considered and, in comparison with other extraneous sources, would
normally be more influential.77
III. Rules vs. Principles
In the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, accounting
standards have come under criticism for contributing to the environment
70. Id.
71. Id. § 69.10. For public companies, SEC rules and releases also fall within this category.
Although SEC Staff Accounting Bulletins are discussed, the standard makes no explicit
categorization of such pronouncements. Id.
72. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 69 does not categorically prohibit the application of
an accounting standard in a lower category if guidance is provided in a higher category
pronouncement. However, use of such standard must be justified. Id. § 69.07.
73. Id. § 69.10. AICPA pronouncements are not to be considered authoritative unless cleared
by the FASB. For this purpose, the FASB has cleared a pronouncement if it has not objected to
the issuance of the pronouncement. Id. § 69.05. Unless the pronouncement indicated otherwise,
it should be presumed that such pronouncement has been cleared by the FASB. Id. § 69.10.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 69.11.
77. Id.
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that made such scandals possible. Specifically, accounting standards are
criticized because they are too rules-based. By rules-based, the critics
refer to standards that are laden with "bright-line" thresholds, excep-
tions, and voluminous implementation guidance.78 They assert that such
standards diminish the quality and transparency of financial accounting
and reporting. In general, the criticisms leveled at current accounting
standards are twofold.
First, and most significantly, rules-based standards allow manage-
ment to structure transactions to circumvent the rules, thereby violating
the intent and spirit of the standards. Rules-based systems tend to be
overinclusive or underinclusive. This argument echoes the familiar criti-
cisms leveled at rule utilitarians and legal formalists, and to an extent,
proponents of principles-based standards are analogous to act utilitarians
or legal realists.79
Similar to act utilitarians, proponents of principles-based account-
ing standards are unwilling to tolerate a "bad" result in the application of
a rule. Similarly, legal realists abhor devotion to rules when such devo-
tion produces a result contrary to their notions of fair play and justice.
In contrast, critics assert that rule utilitarians slavishly follow the rules
even though departure from the rules in a particular case will yield a
better outcome. As a consequence, rule utilitarianism tends to elevate
form over substance.
A second criticism is that rules-based standards have introduced
inordinate complexity, expense, and rigidity into the financial account-
ing and reporting system. Rules-based standards have led to standards
overload and make the system slow to react to changes in the market-
place because unanticipated transactions or developments are difficult to
handle within such a system.
These criticisms may have some validity in exceptional cases but
not as generalizations. Rule utilitarianism, instead of focusing on indi-
78. See PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH, supra note 5, at 2-4; STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION
108(d), supra note 21, at 12-14. See also Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on the Effects of
Principles-and Rules-Based Standards, 17 Ac-r. HORIZONS 91 (2003). The distinction between
rule-based and principle-based standards does not imply that rule-based standards have no
foundation in broad principles. Detailed standards are based on the conceptual foundation set
forth in the Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts. See supra notes 49-50 and
accompanying text.
79. Utilitarianism is an ethical theory under which the rightness of an act is measured by
whether the act produces greater good than harm. Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the utilitarian
movement, and John Stuart Mill are its most well-known proponents. See generally DAVID
STEWARD & H. GENE BLOCKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PHILOSOPHY 296-300 (3d ed. 1992); HENRY
SIDGWICK, THE METHOD OF ETHICS, 411-17 (7th ed. 1982). This theory has significant
application in the formulation of commercial legislation and in business decision-making. A
familiar evolution of the theory is the cost-benefit analysis.
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vidual acts, seeks to arrive at rules that, if adhered to by society, will
yield the greatest good for the greatest number.80 An occasional injus-
tice is tolerated because the rules generate other benefits - be it predict-
ability, consistency, or some other socially desirable attribute - that
more than compensate for the aberrant bad result.8 Whether the benefit
of rules outweighs the occasional "bad result" depends on several fac-
tors.82 Reflexive aversion to rules is simplistic. As Justice Scalia once
noted "[t]here are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at
all." 83
Arguments in support of principles-based standards suffer from two
defects. First, such arguments vastly overstate the problem in several
respects. Second, and more significantly, they fail to consider a signifi-
cant consequence of adopting a principles-based system. The movement
toward such a system necessarily entails a shift from ex ante to ex post
problem resolution. Such a shift raises profound questions about
whether the existing client-auditor model is up to the tasks such a shift
will bring to bear.
A. Problem Overstated
A standard critique of rules-based standards is that such standards
are inevitably defective. Rules are overinclusive and underinclusive.
They are overinclusive when the purpose of the standard would be fur-
thered by not applying the rule, even though the language of the rule
should apply. Alternatively, rules are underinclusive in circumstances
where the language of the rule does not reach, but where the rule's pur-
pose would be furthered through its application. Rules tend to suppress
facts because they focus on some, but not all, facts and circumstances
surrounding a transaction. Consequently, the application of rules-based
standards can produce absurd results. There are four problems with this
argument.
First, the argument is largely based on an exaggerated sense of the
deficiencies that exist in the present system. Second, the argument vir-
tually ignores the existence of mechanisms within the present system to
mitigate, if not prevent, the gamesmanship that the present system alleg-
edly accommodates so comfortably. Third, the recent spate of scandals,
used to buttress such an argument, is evidence that the problem does not
lie with the standards. To the contrary, the recent scandals should serve
80. See STEWARD & BLOCKER, supra note 83, at 300.
81. It can be argued that equality, for example, is an attribute with such fundamental value
that equally unfair results are preferable to unequal, yet fairer, results. See Scalia, supra note 10, at
1178.
82. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
83. Scalia, supra note 10, at 1179.
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to mute the proponents of principles-based standards. Finally, the argu-
ment rests on certain questionable assumptions about the operation of a
principles-based system.
1. DEFECTS MORE ABERRATIONAL THAN SYSTEMIC
Critics of the present state of U.S. accounting standards overstate
their case in two respects. First, assuming arguendo that U.S. account-
ing standards are predominately rules-based, such rules operate admira-
bly in the vast majority of cases. In most cases, there is agreement as to
the meaning of the rule, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances
surrounding the transaction in question. For example, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standard No. 13, Accounting for Leases is consid-
ered paradigmatic of rules-based standards due to its promulgation of
bright-line thresholds for determining whether a lease should be treated
as such or, alternatively, should be treated as a purchase of the asset
putatively leased. 84 However, most leases will fall comfortably below
or above the thresholds, and little dispute will arise about whether, in
substance, an asset has been leased or not. Standard automobile or
office leases, for example, present little accounting difficulty. Likewise,
despite the alleged abuse of consolidation accounting by Enron, the
applicable accounting standards are easily applied to the vast majority of
investments.85 Most corporate owned investments are either wholly
owned subsidiaries or have relatively small minority interests
outstanding.
Second, critics of U.S. accounting standards overstate the extent to
which such standards are, in fact, rules-based. The study conducted by
the SEC, mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, says as much. Accord-
ing to that study, current U.S. accounting standards are best described as
a mixture of rules- and principles-based standards. 86 Rules-based stan-
dards are, in general, limited to very specialized transactions and issues.
Accounting standards for lease and derivative transactions, consolidation
of entities, post-retirement benefits accounting and reporting, stock-
based compensation arrangements, and accounting for income taxes
84. In general, the standard provides four tests for classifying a lease as either an operating
lease or capital lease. The tests focus on whether the lease transfers ownership at the end of the
lease term or contains a bargain purchase option. The tests also measure the lease term and lease
payments against the economic life of the property and its fair market value, respectively. See
infra note 191 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
86. See STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(d), supra note 21, at 24-27. This report breaks
down U.S. accounting standards into three categories: rules-based standards; principles-based
standards; and principles-only standards. The last type of standard is criticized by the SEC report
because, in the opinion of the report's authors, it lacks an appropriate framework for the
application of judgment. See id. at 26.
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constitute the majority of rules-laden standards.87 At first glance, this is
not surprising given the complexity of the subject matter governed by
such standards.88 Moreover, many of the issues addressed by such stan-
dards can be expected to be applicable to most, if not all, entities. As
discussed later in this work, frequency of occurrence suggests that rules-
based standards may be the most effective approach for standard setters
to pursue. 8 9
2. MECHANISMS EXIST TO DEAL WITH ABERRATIONAL CASES
The criticism of the present state of accounting standards discounts
the extent to which the present standards provide auditors with the
opportunity to exercise the judgment and discretion to elevate the sub-
stance of a transaction over its form. The fact that such discretion is not
exercised often enough calls into question the efficacy of the auditing
profession more than it serves to indict the current state of accounting
standards.
The standard form auditor's report - the so-called unqualified
opinion - states that the financial statements "present fairly" the com-
pany's financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in accor-
dance with generally accepted accounting principles. 90 The adverb
"fairly" has been more or less ignored. The SEC's position, expressed
as early as 1938, was that "present fairly" meant present in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles.91 The AICPA's Code of
Professional Conduct states that members may opine that a company's
financial statements are presented fairly in accordance with generally
87. Id. at 24-25.
88. Technological developments have contributed to the complexity of certain transactions.
This is especially true in the case of derivatives. Increases in computing power have enabled the
creation of derivative instruments whose existence - and complexity - would have been
unthinkable a generation ago. In other cases, the issues are complex because the legal
infrastructure underlying the transaction is complex. Accounting for income taxes is a case in
point. Federal, state, and foreign income tax accounting rules contain frequent departures from
generally accepted accounting principles. In most cases, the differences that arise are differences
in timing. Tax rules may require the recognition of income or expense at a point in time different
from the point at which the revenue or expense item is recognized under generally accepted
accounting principles - depreciation expense and loss accrual timing differences are ubiquitous.
Other differences are permanent. For example, certain interest income is exempt from taxation
and certain fines and penalties are not deductible. See I.R.C. §§ 103; 162(0. Multinational
corporations must account for tax expenses associated with multiple taxing jurisdictions and the
Byzantine complexity of the foreign tax credit rules. Accounting for income taxes reflects the
inherent complexity in the Internal Revenue Code and other applicable taxing regimes.
89. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
90. The phrase "present fairly" has been in use since 1934 when the American Institute of
Accountants, later to be renamed the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
introduced it in the first standard form report.
91. See Zeff, supra note 11, at 55 n.10 (citing ACCOUNTING SERIES RELEASE No. 4 (1938)).
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accepted accounting principles even though they contain a departure
from authoritative pronouncement, but only if the departure is necessary
to prevent the statements from being misleading.92 Consequently, some
room for departure from the rules is provided, but the evidentiary hurdle
is high 93 - but not so high as to have failed to prevent some of Enron's
shenanigans.94
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 69, The Meaning of Present
Fairly in Conformity With Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in
the Independent Auditor's Report, appears to provide ample flexibility in
the application of accounting standards. This pronouncement makes
clear that "fairness" is to be determined within the framework of gener-
ally accepted accounting principles. 95 However, the "auditor's opinion
that financial statements present fairly ... in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles should be based on his or her judgment
as to whether ... the accounting principles are appropriate in the cir-
cumstances."96 Moreover, this auditing standard unambiguously states
that generally accepted accounting principles recognize the importance
of reporting transactions and events in accordance with their substance,
and further states that auditors should consider whether the substance of
a transaction differs materially from its form.9 7
Unfortunately, the standard's rather clear mandate is made opaque
by subsequent language in the standard. As discussed earlier in this
work, generally accepted accounting principles have their genesis in
various sources and a hierarchy of accounting standards has devel-
oped. 98 Statement on Auditing Standard No. 69 provides that the auditor
should be prepared to justify departures from accounting principles in
categories B, C, and D. However, nowhere does the statement discuss
departures from Category A, the most authoritative source of standards.
Despite the admonition to ascertain the substance of a transaction, an
auditor can reasonably infer that no departures from Category A pro-
nouncements may be justified.
92. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 65, § 203, Rule 203.
93. Rule 203 has been interpreted to mean that there is a strong presumption that adherence to
officially established accounting principles would in nearly all instances result in financial
statements that are not misleading. "Unusual circumstances" may arise on occasion that would
justify a departure from established accounting principles. New legislation or the evolution of a
new form of business transaction are the two examples of such "unusual circumstances" that are
provided. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 203, INTERPRETATIONS UNDER RULE 203-1 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1993).
94. See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
95. THE MEANING OF PRESENT FAIRLY IN CoNFoRIrY WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES IN THE INDEPENDENT AUDITORS REPORT, supra note 72, § 69.03.
96. Id. § 69.04 (emphasis provided).
97. Id. § 69.06.
98. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
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In any event, the notion that rule-driven standards allow companies
to hide behind the form of a transaction with impunity and that the fix
must lie with the accounting standards themselves is nonsense. Auditing
standards could be clarified by giving some content to the phrase "pre-
sent fairly" and by making clear that the application of accounting stan-
dards should not be a mechanical exercise devoid of professional
discretion and judgment.
B. Evidence From Recent Scandals
The evidence presented by the recent scandals does not support the
critics of the present system. Despite the complexity and notoriety of
Enron's fraudulent accounting, the majority of the accounting impropri-
eties that have come to light in recent years have resulted from more
pedestrian tactics - simple earnings management. 99 In most cases,
accounting manipulations took place within the confines of basic accrual
accounting concepts. 00 The WorldCom fraud, the largest accounting
fraud in U.S. history, involved nothing more elaborate than the capitali-
zation of operating expenses.1 ' Basic income and expense accruals
often involve significant judgment and, consequently, managerial discre-
tion. One commentator, citing former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt,
noted:
The method of achieving earnings management primarily involves
the use of accounting techniques created primarily to allow and
encourage companies to be flexible in the recording of their transac-
tions in order to facilitate the primary goal of generally accepted
accounting principles, that of ensuring substance over form in the
99. Earnings management refers to practices that manipulate earnings either through
aggressive application of accounting standards or by flagrant abuse of such standards. The
number of companies beating earnings estimates by exactly one cent per share quadrupled
between the years 1992 and 1999. See Jerry Useem, In Corporate America It's Cleanup Time,
FORTUNE, Sept. 16, 2002, at 63-64. In many cases, corporations actually seek to decrease earnings
in an effort to smooth earnings fluctuations. For a recent example, see Patrick Barta & John D.
McKinnon, Freddie Mac May Have Understated Profits by up to $4.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., June
26, 2003, at Cl. Forthcoming research by Professor Lawrence Brown of Georgia State University
will report that investors reacted more harshly to companies' failure to meet analysts' earnings
estimates than they did to decreased earnings or losses. See Ken Brown, Corporate Reform: The
First Year: Wall Street Plays Numbers Game with Earnings, Despite Reforms, WALL ST. J., July
22, 2003, at Al.
100. Under the accrual basis method of accounting, revenues are recognized when the earnings
process is complete and expenses are recognized when incurred. Moreover, expenditures that
create a benefit extending substantially beyond the year in which such expenditures are made are
capitalized and charged to expense periodically over their useful life. In contrast, the cash basis
method of accounting recognizes revenues and expenses as cash is received or expended.
101. See Kurt Eichenwald & Simon Romero, Turmoil at WorldCom: The Decision Making;
The Latest Corporate Scandal Is Sudden, Vast and Simple, N.Y. TIMEs, June 27, 2002, at Al.
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recognition of an accounting transaction whenever possible. '
0 2
Oftentimes, distortions of financial information occur entirely
outside the purview of generally accepted principles as evidenced by the
questionable use of pro forma earnings. 0 3  Most often, however,
accounting improprieties incident to earnings management generally
exploit relatively straightforward accounting standards."° Such stan-
dards usually provide general guidance and leave much room for mana-
gerial discretion in their application. Ironically, the scandals have
involved the broad, principles-based standards for which the critics
clamor. Among the more common manipulations are those involving
revenue recognition and expense accruals.
During the so-called "bubble years" of the late 1990s, earnings
became pass6 and new metrics were introduced to support ever-higher
102. Manuel A. Rodriguez, Comment: The Numbers Game: Manipulation of Financial
Reporting by Corporations and Their Executives, 10 U. MiAMi Bus. L. REv. 451, 460 (2002)
(emphasis provided).
103. Pro forma financial information relies on various measures of financial performance that
depart from generally accepted accounting principles. Metrics could include earnings exclusive of
so-called "nonrecurring" charges and non-cash charges such as depreciation and amortization.
Companies had almost unfettered discretion to issue pro forma figures that presented the results of
financial statements in a favorable light. Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 107
Pub. L. No. 204, 116 Stat. 786, requires the SEC to issue regulations to prevent perceived abuses
in the issuance of pro forma earnings. In general, the regulations should require companies to
present such information in a manner that is not misleading and reconcile such information to
figures prepared under generally accepted accounting principles. The SEC issued final
regulations, in the form of new Regulation G, effective March 28, 2003. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 244.100 - 244.102 (2003) (implementing the directive in the legislation). As a consequence,
many firms have discontinued releasing pro forma information. See Phyllis Plitch, More
Companies Say They Avoid Releasing Pro Forma Statements, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2003, at C9
(reporting that one survey of 600 companies found that more than forty percent of companies
surveyed reported results strictly in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles).
The replacement of compensatory stock options with grants of restricted stock has led some
companies to mute the resulting earnings charge by excluding such charges in their presentation of
pro forma earnings. See Nick Wingfield, Options Move May Be at Expense of Accounting Purists,
WALL ST. J., July 14, 2003, at Cl (reporting that Amazon.com has excluded expenses associated
with grants of restricted stock from their pro forma earnings). See infra notes 264-75 and
accompanying text for a discussion of stock option accounting. In addition to pro forma financial
information, other metrics outside the scope of generally accepted accounting principles were
often used to paint an overly optimistic - if not misleading - picture of a company's operations.
See, e.g., Julia Angwin, A Bulk-Sales Initiative by AOL May Have Inflated Subscriptions, WALL
ST. J., July 25, 2003, at Al (describing AOL's practice of including heavily discounted bulk
subscriptions sold to corporate customers in publicly disclosed subscriber figures); Shawn Young,
Talking Up 'Net Debt' Allows Some Firms To Take a Load Off, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2003, at Cl
(discussing the practice, employed by a number of firms, of reporting total debt net of cash and
cash equivalents as "net debt.").
104. In a recent comparative study of earnings opacity in many countries, earnings opacity was
measured by earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and earnings smoothing. Earnings
aggressiveness and earnings smoothing are often achieved through manipulation of accruals. See
Utpal Bhattacharya et al., The World Price of Earnings Opacity, 78 Accr. REv. 641, 645-49
(2003).
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stock prices. Top-line revenue growth was one such metric.10 5 Under
generally accepted accounting principles, revenues are recognized when
the earnings process is complete. Long-standing conceptual guidance,
but very little authoritative guidance, exists for this bedrock principle.
An entity earns revenue by delivering or producing goods, rendering
services, or other activities that constitute its major operations, and reve-
nues are considered earned when the entity has substantially accom-
plished what it must do to be entitled to the revenues. 10 6 Such a broad
formulation invariably invites the exercise of discretion in its application
to the myriad factual situations that enterprises encounter in conducting
their business.
One study reported that more than half of the financial reporting
frauds among public companies between 1987 and 1997 involved reve-
nue overstatements.10 7 Common techniques for manipulating revenue
have involved attempts at accelerating the timing of income. In addition
to flagrant manipulations aimed at accelerating revenue recognition,
such as backdating documents, less odious methods, such as channel-
stuffing, have been employed. 0 8 In addition to the general conceptual
guidance described above for revenue recognition, authoritative gui-
dance does exist for recognizing revenues in more specific settings. The
Accounting Principles Board issued Opinion No. 29, providing authori-
tative guidelines for the accounting of nonmonetary transactions -
transactions that involve exchanges of assets.10 9 A.P.B. Opinion No. 29
sets forth the general rule that, in nonmonetary exchanges, the fair mar-
ket value of the asset surrendered is the measure of the value received in
105. Some metrics that were used bordered on the absurd. For example, the number of
"eyeballs" for a company's web-based business was often used as benchmark of success.
106. RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT IN FINANcIAL STATEMENTS OF BusiNEss ENTERPRISES,
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 5, supra note 49, § 83b. Earlier
conceptual guidance was issued by the Accounting Principles Board. See id., § 83, n.54-56.
107. See Thomas J. Phillips, Jr. et al., The Right Way to Recognize Revenue, J. AcCT., June
2001, at 39 (reporting the findings of Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission).
108. Channel-stuffing refers to the practice of shipping to customers quantities of product well
in excess of their needs with the tacit understanding that unsold merchandise may be returned.
The former controller of Network Associates, Inc., for example, pleaded guilty to federal charges
of securities fraud for his role in an alleged plan that included secret payments to distributors to
hold unsold inventory of software products. See Don Clark & Deborah Solomon, SEC Focuses on
Videogame Industry, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2003, at A3. Sunbeam Corporation restated its
financial results from the fourth quarter of 1996 to the first quarter of 1998 in large part due to the
overstatement of revenues from so-called bill and hold contracts and guaranteed consignment
sales. Sunbeam's problems generated much publicity, but mainly due to its outspoken and
controversial chief executive officer, Albert Dunlap. See Dana Canedy, Sunbeam Restates
Results, and "Fix" Shows Significant Warts, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1998, at C6.
109. ACCOUNTING FOR NONMONETARY TRANSACTIONS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
OPINION No. 29 (Am. Inst. of Certified. Pub. Accountants 1973).
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the exchange and, hence, the amount of revenue to be recognized from
the transaction. t l In the event that the fair market value of the asset
received is more clearly evident than that of the asset surrendered, then
the fair market value of the asset received should be used in recording
the transaction.''
Two exceptions are made to the general rule. The earnings process
is not deemed complete in situations where the asset exchanged is held
for sale in the ordinary course of business and is exchanged for an asset
that is similarly held." 2 In addition, in the case of a productive asset not
held for sale in the ordinary course, the earnings process is not deemed
complete if that asset is exchanged for a similar asset." 3
The accounting standard is relatively straightforward. Revenue is
recognized in non-cash transactions, but only if the transaction results in
a substantive change in the position of the party to the exchange.
Merely swapping inventory or similar productive assets does culminate
the earnings process.' "' This is hardly a detailed or complex standard
yet many of the reported accounting scandals involved asset swaps that
improperly inflated revenues and, in some cases, earnings." 5
110. Id. § 18.
111. Id.
112. Id. § 21a.
113. Id. § 21b.
114. To a certain extent, the accounting rules are analogous to the tax-free exchange rules of
I.R.C. § 1031. For federal income tax purposes, no gain or loss is recognized on the exchange of
property held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment if such property is
exchanged solely for property of like kind that is similarly held. Gain, however, is recognized to
the extent other property is received in addition to qualifying like kind property. See I.R.C.
§§ 1031(a)-(b) (2002). There are numerous nonrecognition provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code, and these provisions are a matter of legislative grace that defer the incidence of taxation
until a more substantial change in the form of the assets held takes place. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 351
(deferring gain from the contribution of assets to a controlled corporation); 354 (deferring gain
from the receipt of stock or securities in certain qualifying reorganizations); 721 (deferring gain
from the contribution of assets by a partner in exchange for a partnership interest).
115. A swap is a barter-type transaction in which enterprises exchange goods or services.
Some firms abused these transactions by not only recognizing revenue from swaps of similar
productive assets but, in some cases, actually recording the value of their obligation under the
swap as a capital expense, thereby increasing earnings. The telecommunications industry and
web-based businesses were especially abusive in this regard. The practices of both Qwest
Communications International and Global Crossing are the subject of congressional
investigations. See Simon Romero, Internal Notes Questioned Qwest's Swaps, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 2002, at C4. A variant of the swap transaction is the "round-trip" transaction. Such a
transaction appears to be an arms-length sale but has no economic substance because the
purchaser receives advanced funds in some form by the seller and a reciprocal obligation to
purchase is placed on the seller. See Daniel V. Dooley, Financial Fraud: Accounting Theory and
Practice, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 53, 71 (2002); see also David D. Kirkpatrick, Shares Are
Up, But Lawsuits May Unsettle AOL's Future, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2003, at C1 (reporting on
pending legal action against AOL as a result of the company's inflating revenue by $190 million
over twenty-one months by use of "round-trip" transactions); David D. Kirkpatrick, Guilty Pleas
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The general concept for revenue recognition was clarified in its
application to transactions with multiple elements, specifically sales of
product and services. Although these types of transaction have long
taken place, their use increased dramatically with the growth of the
software industry. Sales of software are often bundled with mainte-
nance, installation, and integration services. Whether the earnings pro-
cess is complete, and to what extent, is less clear for such arrangements
because the seller's service obligations may extend for a significant time
after the sale.
The AICPA and the SEC addressed the issue of revenue recogni-
tion in connection with multiple-element arrangements in general and
software transactions in particular.116 The principle set forth is straight-
forward - revenues should be allocated among the elements of a multi-
ple-element transaction according to the respective fair market value of
the elements. Fair market value estimates are to be supported by verifia-
ble objective evidence, and mere reliance on stated or agreed-upon
prices is prohibited." 7 The determination of fair market value requires,
in most cases, managerial judgment and discretion. Such discretion is
subject to, and has resulted in, abuse. Through mischaracterization of
the terms or nature of the contract elements, distortion of the signifi-
cance of various components, misstatement of pricing information, and
artificial bifurcation of the contract into separate contracts, firms have
been able to manipulate the accounting for such arrangements. 1 8 As a
consequence, the FASB has revisited this issue on numerous occa-
sions." 9 Arguably, the inordinate amount of attention that standard set-
Are Expected At Homestore, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002, at Cl (describing the use of "round-
tripping" at Homestore's web-based operation).
116. See SoFrwAE REVENUE RECOGNITION, STATEMENT OF PosIoN 97-2 (Am. Inst. of
Certified. Pub. Accountants 1997); Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements, SEC STA'F
ACCOUNTING BULLETIN No. 101 (Dec. 3, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/
sabl01.htm.
117. The rationale for this requirement is the belief that, in a multiple-element arrangement,
prices may not be representative of the value of the individual elements because the prices of
individual components can be altered in negotiations and still result in the same overall
consideration. See Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements, supra note 121, at Question 5.
118. See Dooley, supra note 120, at 73. See also Nancy Dillon, KPMG Hit with Fraud Charge
- SEC Links 4 Partners to Xerox Scam, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 30, 2003, at 37 (reporting that
the SEC charged KPMG and four of its partners with fraud in connection with Xerox accounting
irregularities. Such irregularities principally involved the inflation of revenue by recognizing
income prematurely on equipment and servicing contracts).
119. The FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force reached consensus on Issue 00-21, Revenue
Arrangements with Multiple Deliverables. Moreover, the Emerging Issue Task Force had under
consideration three other issues: Issue No. 00-24, Revenue Recognition: Sales Arrangements That
Include Specified Price Trade-in Rights; Issue No. 03-05, Applicability of AlCPA Statement of
Position 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition, to Non-Software Deliverables in an Arrangement
Containing More-Than-Incidental Software; Issue No. 02-G, Recognition of Revenue from
Licensing Arrangements on Intellectual Property. A consensus was reached on Issue No. 03-05,
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ters have devoted to this issue in recent years is a reaction to perceived
abuse and not a cause of abuse.
The FASB has issued specific rules for revenue recognition when
the buyer has certain rights of return.' 2' The standard is conceptually
simple. Certain conditions are identified that indicate that the earnings
process has not been complete. Revenue should be deferred if one or
more of those conditions exist. Those conditions are: The price is not
fixed or determinable; the buyer is not obligated to pay the seller until
the product is resold to an end-user; the buyer is not obligated to pay in
the event the product is stolen, destroyed, or lost; the buyer has no eco-
nomic substance apart from the seller; the seller has significant obliga-
tions to aid the buyer in the resale of the product; or the amount of future
returns cannot be reasonably estimated. 2 1  These conditions, however,
have been manipulated through various means, including use of side
agreements or oral promises that disguise rights of return and use of
straw parties to conceal the true nature of the arrangements.1
22
The accounting irregularities involving manipulation of revenues
are by no means limited to those above. 123 However, revenue recogni-
but the FASB was not asked to ratify the consensus for procedural reasons. Issues No. 00-24 and
02-G have been removed from the task force's agenda because the FASB has agreed to add a
major revenue recognition to its agenda. See Emerging Issues Task Force: Description and Status
of Current Issues, available at http://www.fasb.org/eitf/eitfissu.shtml.
120. Revenue Recognition When Right of Return Exists, STATEMENT OF FINANcIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 48 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1981).
121. Id. § 6.
122. See Dooley, supra note 115, at 68-70. Certain round-trip transactions also flout Statement
of Accounting Standards No. 48 because the buyer is advanced funds from the seller and, in
substance, encounters no economic risk from the transaction.
123. For example, gains from the disposition of assets may be classified as part of operating
revenues, thereby giving the impression that operating results are more robust than is actually the
case. Alternatively, nonrecurring income from the sale of a business unit may be classified as a
reduction in general and administrative expenses, a classification IBM employed. Such a
classification presents a more favorable impression of results from ongoing operations. See Jim
Krane, Report of Probe Hits IBM Stock, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Apr. 12, 2002, at El. Apparently,
classification issues are not limited to revenues. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. is under
formal investigation by the SEC with respect to classification of expenses as part of selling,
general, and administrative expenses. See Vanessa O'Connell, R.J. Reynolds Faces SEC Probe
Related to Expense Accounting, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2003, at B3. Manipulation of percentage
of completion accounting has also resulted in the distortion of financial results. Long-term
contracts are accounted for by one of two methods. The first, the completed contract method,
requires that income from a long-term contract be recognized upon completion of the contract.
Alternatively, the percentage of completion method allows income to be recognized over the life
of the contract in proportion to the percentage of the contract completed. This method requires
that contract costs and profits be estimated. See generally LONG-TERM CONSTRUCTION TYPE
CONTRACTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 45 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1955). It is relatively easy for companies to overestimate the percentage of the contract completed
and thus overstate revenue and income. See Simon Romero & Barnaby J. Feder, In a Low Key,
New E.D.S. Chief Hopes to Regain Skeptics' Trust, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at C1 (discussing
the aggressive accounting employed by Electronic Data Systems on several large contracts).
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tion rests on a very simple, yet judgmental foundation. As new types of
arrangements proliferated, additional guidance was provided that, in
most cases, was based on broad principles. More specific guidance
appeared only after the accounting profession proved inept at satisfacto-
rily applying the broad guidance.
Accounting for liability reserves is, like revenue recognition, based
on broad conceptual standards and has similarly been prone to manipula-
tive and abusive practices. "Reserves" is the term generally used for
liabilities that have, in an accounting sense, been incurred but are not yet
fixed in a transactional sense.124 Common types of reserves are those
established for estimated warranty costs on products sold, settlement
costs for ongoing litigation, expected environmental cleanup costs, and
severance and other costs associated with downsizing a business
operation. 125
Authoritative guidance for accounting for contingencies is provided
by Statement of Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for Contingen-
cies.12 6 A loss contingency is defined as a situation where a possible
loss is subject to "an existing condition, situation, or set of circum-
stances involving uncertainty ... that will ultimately be resolved when
one or more future events occur or fail to occur." 1 27  Accounting for
such contingencies is dependent upon the likelihood of the loss occur-
ring. A loss contingency must be accrued as a charge to income if it is
both probable that the loss will occur and the amount can be reasonably
estimated.128 In the event the contingency is probable but the amount
may not be reasonably estimated, or in cases in which loss is reasonably
possible but not probable, footnote disclosure is required. Remote con-
tingencies need not be disclosed.129
124. In this respect, financial accounting standards differ markedly from tax accounting rules.
For tax accounting purposes, a liability may not be accrued until all the events occur that establish
the fact that a liability has been incurred; the amount of such liability must be determinable with
reasonable accuracy. Moreover, economic performance must occur, which, for certain types of
expenses, precludes any accrual at all. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.46 1-1(a)(2) (1999); 1.461-4
(1999). With few exceptions, reserves are not properly accrued for tax purposes.
125. Reserves for bad debts are similar, but technically they are treated as a reduction of
accounts receivable and not as liabilities. These reserves are established to estimate the amounts
that are deemed uncollectible from accounts receivable. These reserves are also susceptible to
manipulation. Excessive reserves against accounts receivables may be established in an effort to
smooth earnings. Alternatively, reserves for uncollectible accounts receivable may be understated
in an effort to improve earnings. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, HealthSouth Looks Deeper Into Its
Books, N.Y. TimEs, July 12, 2003, at Cl, (reporting that an internal investigation uncovered
evidence that reserves for uncollectible accounts were understated).
126. STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 5, ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1975).
127. Id. § 1.
128. Id. § 8.
129. Probable is defined as likely to occur. Remote contingencies are those with a slight
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The determination of whether a loss is probable, as opposed to
merely reasonably possible, is subject to managerial discretion and judg-
ment. Similarly, estimates of the amount of loss with respect to the con-
tingency in question are often based on subjective factors. In an effort to
purge the balance sheet, management often took "big bath" charges.
These charges, major one-time items that create reserves related to lay-
offs, restructurings, obsolete inventory, and other such items, were often
used to inflate earnings in future periods by eliminating large cost com-
ponents from future periods. Because these charges were classified as
nonrecurring, the impact of such charges on the companies stock was
muted.1 30 Consequently, such reserves were often excessive.
Excessive reserves also served another purpose as a source of
future earnings. So-called "cookie-jar" reserves allowed companies to
reverse such reserves in future periods if needed to bolster earnings.
Predictable and sustained earnings growth was an attribute highly valued
by Wall Street. In periods of excess earnings, the establishment of
excessive reserves reduces earnings and places liabilities on the balance
sheet that, if needed, can be reversed to bolster income in a future
year. 131
Close cousins to contingency reserves are write-offs - used to
reflect the impairment of long-lived assets to be held and used. Impair-
chance of occurring. Reasonably possible contingencies are those whose likelihood of occurrence
is between probable and remote. See id. § 3. Guarantee agreements, obligations under letters of
credit, and standby agreements must be disclosed in all cases, regardless of the possibility of
performance under such arrangements. See id. § 12.
130. Such nonrecurring or one-time charges were usually excluded in the determination of pro
forma earnings. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Classification of such charges as
nonrecurring for pro forma purposes does not affect the reporting of such items under generally
accepted accounting principles. Under such principles, earnings are generally reported from
continuing operations, discontinued operations, and extraordinary items. See REPORTING THE
RESULTS OF OPERATIONS - REPORTING THE EFFECTS OF DISPOSAL OF A SEGMENT OF A
BUSINESS, AND EXTRAORDINARY, UNUSUAL AND INFREQUENTLY OCCURRING EVENTS AND
TRANSACTIONS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD OPINION No. 30 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1973). The FASB is considering proposals to overhaul the presentation of the
income statement. One such proposal would require companies to report "comprehensive
income" instead of net income. Such a change would result in more items flowing through the
income statement instead of shareholders equity. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Deals & Deal Makers:
Accounting Changes Are in Store, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2003, at C4 (reporting on the comments
by Robert Herz, chairman of the FASB, at a New York State Society of Certified Public
Accountants conference).
131. W.R. Grace's National Medical Unit was particularly aggressive in this regard.
Management allegedly ordered earnings above a cap amount to be placed in reserve. In
subsequent periods, such reserves were reversed when needed to bolster earnings. See Ann Davis,
SEC Case Claims Profit Management by Grace, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1999, at Cl. See also Dawn
Kopecki, Freddie Mac's Use of Reserve Accounts Falls Under Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., July 8,
2003, at Cl (reporting that the SEC is investigating Freddie Mac's use of reserves to smooth
earnings).
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ment of an asset is the condition that exists when the carrying amount of
the asset exceeds its fair value.132 A loss must be recognized for such
impairment if the asset's carrying amount is not recoverable.133 The
subjectivity inherent in this standard was often exploited to justify the
creation of "big bath" restructuring charges and "cookie jar" reserves,
particularly in the case of corporate acquisitions.
1 34
The accounting maneuvers employed by Enron have become para-
digmatic of the ills that have befallen accounting standards. Particular
focus was placed on Enron's use of off-balance sheet partnerships and
the seeming failure of existing accounting standards in preventing the
132. ACCOUNTING FOR THE IMPAIRMENT OR DISPOSAL OF LONG-LIVED ASSETS, STATEMENT
OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 144, § 7 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2001)
(superceding ACCOUNTING FOR THE IMPAIRMENT OF LONG-LIVED ASSETS AND FOR LONG-LIVED
ASSETS To BE DISPOSED OF, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 121 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1995)). This standard also sets forth rules for accounting for
impairment of assets to be abandoned or to be sold. The standard does not apply to certain
specialized industries for which separate accounting guidance exists, nor to certain financial
instruments. See id. § 5. Under generally accepted accounting principles, the carrying amount of
an asset is generally historical cost less accumulated depreciation.
133. Id. The recoverability of an asset's carrying value is determined by comparing such
carrying amount to the undiscounted cash flows expected to result from the use and eventual
disposition of such asset. Certain factors are mentioned that indicate that an asset should be tested
for impairment. Such factors include a significant decrease in the market price of such asset, a
significant adverse change in the extent or manner in which the asset is used, and significant
adverse legal changes. See id. § 7-8.
134. An acquiring corporation may, for example, assign a significant portion of the purchase
price of an acquired business to research in process only to write off such research during one
period. In so doing, the acquiring corporation incurs one bad quarter, but future periods are
purged of additional earnings charges. Generally, assets acquired should be assigned a cost, or
carrying amount, based on the relative fair market values of the assets acquired. A discussion of
purchase accounting is beyond the scope of this work. Prior to 2001, two general methods of
accounting were in use for business combinations: the purchase method, under which the assets of
the acquired enterprise were assigned the cost of acquisition; and the pooling of interest method,
under which the carrying value of the assets of the acquired enterprise were not adjusted. See
generally BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD. OPINION No. 16 (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 1970). The pooling of interest method was severely criticized and, in
an effort to harmonize U.S. acquisition accounting standards with international standards, the
pooling of interest method is no longer permissible. See generally BUSINESS COMBINATIONS,
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 141 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2001) (superceding ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD OPINION No. 16). Assigning a significant
portion of such costs to research in-process instead of tangible assets or less ephemeral intangible
assets, such as goodwill or workforce in place, results in less periodic charges to future periods.
See Justin Gillis, Firm's Profits Survive Scrutiny of SEC Microscope, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1999,
at El (describing WorldCom's accounting for its merger with MCI and AOL's accounting for its
acquisition of Mirabilis, Ltd.). Lynn Turner, the former Chief Accountant of the SEC, asserted
that during the past decade at least 140 acquiring companies wrote off, or attempted to write off,
in-process research of the acquired target. Darin Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When It Comes
to Auditing?, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 57, 66 n.39 (2002). It strains credibility that an acquiring
corporation could assign significant value to research in process in justifying the price it is willing
to pay for the target, yet then write off such research in the near future as worthless.
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resulting distortions in Enron's reported financial position.'35 The finan-
cial accounting standards that have come under criticism are, admittedly,
complex, but they are so because the underlying transactions to which
they apply are complex. The standards do, however, provide ample
room for the exercise of professional judgment, and, more so than on the
standards themselves, blame should be laid on the failure of various pro-
fessionals to responsibly exercise sound judgment.
An "off-balance sheet" entity is an investee entity whose assets and
liabilities are not included in the balance sheet of the investor entity.
Such treatment is common in accounting for investments in special pur-
pose vehicles (SPVs). SPVs are used in asset securitization transactions
and structured financings. Asset securitization transactions can take sev-
eral forms, but the broad structure of the transactions follows a similar
pattern. Assets representing financial claims, such as auto loans receiva-
ble, credit card receivables and the like, are transferred to an SPV. The
SPV is funded by investors who lend funds to the SPV or are issued
equity stakes in the entity. The transferor usually retains a residual
interest in the SPV. 136 The legal form that the SPV takes varies. Part-
nerships, limited liability companies, corporations, and trusts are com-
monly used. The particular form used depends on the peculiarities of
the transaction in question, but the two principal concerns in selecting
the form are avoidance of an entity level tax 137 and bankruptcy remote-
ness.' 38 Structured financings make use of SPVs to finance investments
135. Section 401 (c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates that the SEC "... . complete a study of
filings by issuers and their disclosures to determine - (A) the extent of off-balance sheet
transactions . . . and the use of special purpose entities; and (B) whether generally accepted
accounting rules result in financial statements of issuers reflecting the economics of such off-
balance sheet transactions."
136. The assets transferred to the SPV are typically in excess of the amount necessary to
collateralize the investors' stake in the entity. The retention of a residual interest allows the
transferor of the assets to remain over-collateralized.
137. The federal income taxation of such entities was greatly simplified in 1996 by the
issuance of final regulations that, in general, allow most noncorporate forms to escape entity level
taxation. These so-called "check-the-box" regulations allow such entities to elect to be taxed as
partnerships for federal income tax purposes. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, 3 (2001).
For federal income tax purposes, partnership income is not taxed at the entity level. Instead, the
income is passed through to the partners and, assuming the partner is a taxable entity or
individual, is subject to tax at the partner level. See generally I.R.C. §§ 701-04 (2002).
Corporations, in contrast, are subject to tax with certain exceptions. Most of the exceptions have
little applicability to securitization transactions. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1361-75; 856-59 (2002)
(providing the rules for S Corporations and Real Estate Investment Trusts, respectively).
However, a corporation may qualify as a Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust (FASIT)
and thereby avoid entity level taxation. See I.R.C. § 860H-L (2002).
138. The retention of a residual interest in the assets raises issues as to whether the assets of the
trust may be subject to the claims of the transferor's creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. The use
of the SPV is designed to insulate the assets transferred from such claims. Generally, the
corporate form is preferred in terms of bankruptcy remoteness from the transferor of the assets.
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in real estate, equipment, or other property. Typically, an SPV is formed
to construct or purchase such assets and lease them to the company. All
or a portion of the construction costs or purchase price is borrowed, and
the lease payments service the debt. The SPV is designed to avoid
entity-level taxation and to create bankruptcy remoteness from the
lessee.
Off-balance sheet entities can be favorable from the standpoint of
an investee because the investee's share of the debt of the entity does not
appear on the investee's balance sheet, thus improving certain financial
ratios that stock analysts and credit rating agencies examine. 139 The
accounting for investments in other entities takes one of three forms, two
of which achieve off-balance sheet treatment for the investee entity's
assets and liabilities.
The cost method of accounting for investments requires that an
investment be carried at cost and is adjusted only for subsequent invest-
ments, dispositions, and impairments in value.14° Dividends received
are recorded as income. 4 ' Distributions received reduce the carrying
value of the investment. 142 Under this method, the composition of the
investee's underlying assets and liabilities are ignored.
The second method, the equity method of accounting, likewise
results in the exclusion of the investee entity's assets and liabilities from
the investor's balance sheet. However, in the case of a corporate inves-
tee, the investor records its share of investee's income and loss and con-
comitantly adjusts the carrying value of the investment. 4 3 The equity
method is required for situations in which the investor's financial inter-
est in the investee is not a controlling financial interest in the investee,
yet nonetheless enables the investor to exercise significant influence
over operating and financial policies of the investee. 44 It is presumed
that ownership of twenty percent or more of the voting interests in the
The trust form, however, provides greater protection for the senior security holders. For an
analysis of the relative merits of the various forms of entities used for SPVs, see Steven L.
Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 Bus. LAW.
559 (2003).
139. The net equity position of the investor is generally unaffected by whether the investee
entity's assets and liabilities are included in the investor's balance sheet. However, by reporting
only the net investment in the entity in contrast to "grossing-up" the balance sheet by including
both assets and liabilities, an investor's debt-equity ratio is generally improved.
140. THE EQUITY METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR INVESTMENTS IN COMMON STOCK,
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD OPINION No. 18, § 6a (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1971).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 10.
143. Id. For partnerships and other pass-through entity investments, the investor recognizes its
share of the entity's income and loss and adjusts the carrying value of its investment accordingly.
144. Id. § 17. A controlling financial interest is generally present if the investee owns more
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investee provides the investor with the ability to exercise significant
influence over operating and financial policies of the investee.145 Con-
versely, ownership of less than twenty percent of the voting interests in
the investee presumptively signifies the lack of such ability.' 46 Both
presumptions, however, may be rebutted by facts and circumstances. 147
The third method, consolidation, essentially treats the investor and
investee as one entity, thereby requiring the investor to include the
assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses of the investee in consolidated
financial statements. 4 8 When an investor, directly or indirectly, has a
controlling financial interest in another entity, it is presumed that consol-
idated financial statements are more meaningful than separate financial
statements.' 49 A controlling financial interest is generally evidenced by
ownership of a majority voting interest in the investee entity.1 50
These three methods provide the basic framework for accounting
for investments but they were promulgated in a different era. The com-
plexity of transactions and the proliferation of SPVs of various forms
overwhelmed professionals' ability to fit such transactions and entities
into a standard that envisioned plain vanilla corporate investments.
With some prompting from the SEC, the FASB's Emerging Issues Task
Force reached consensus on several issues.' 5' One such consensus,
dealing with lease transactions through SPVs, required that unrelated
investors provide at least three percent of the capital of the SPV in order
for the SPV to remain unconsolidated. 152  This requirement was not
meant as a safe harbor nor was it meant to replace a more nuanced facts




147. See CRITERIA FOR APPLYING THE EQUITY METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR INVESTMENTS IN
COMMON STOCK, INTERPRETATION No. 35 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1981) (describing
several circumstances in which the presumption of the ability of an investor to exercise influence
is rebutted). The FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force has on its agenda Issue No. 02-14, Whether
the Equity Method of Accounting Applied When an Investor Does Not Have an Investment in
Voting Stock of an Investee but Exercises Significant Influence through Other Means, available at
http://www.fasb.org/eitf/eitfissu.shtml.
148. Rules are provided to account for minority interests and for the elimination of
intercompany transactions. See generally CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 51 §§ 7-15 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1959).
149. Id. § 1.
150. Id. § 2.
151. See Luppino, supra note 50, at 64-67. See also id. at 65 n.63 (describing the various
Emerging Issue Task Force Issues).
152. Id. at 66 (discussing IMPACT OF NONSUBSTANTIVE LESSOR'S, RESIDUAL VALUE AND
GUARANTEES, AND OTHER PROVISIONS IN LEASING TRANSACTIONS I, EMERGING ISSUES TASK
FORCE ISSUE No. 90-15 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1990)).
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and circumstances analysis.' 53
Enron aggressively employed off-balance sheet partnerships to pre-
sent the company in a more favorable light than might otherwise be
warranted. The company exploited the three percent capital rule dis-
cussed above. 154  Moreover, the off-balance sheet entity was managed
by a general partner entity whose owner was an Enron employee.
1 55
Existing rules for consolidation contained adequate flexibility in forcing
the substance of Enron's transactions to be reflected in its accounting.
As previously mentioned, the three percent capital requirement was not
meant to be a bright-line test. 156 Moreover, the definition of a "control-
ling financial interest" necessary to trigger consolidation accounting is
vague enough to have allowed the totality of circumstances surrounding
the transactions to be considered in the decision of whether consolida-
tion accounting was appropriate.
1 57
The FASB, in the wake of Enron scandal and the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,' 58 issued an Interpretation that more clearly man-
dates a substance over form approach to the consolidation issue.
15 9
However, the standards that existed prior to the issuance of this Interpre-
tation provided ample opportunity for substance to prevail over form. 6 °
153. Id.
154. See id. at 68-73 (describing various transactions that Enron entered into with off-balance
sheet partnerships and citing from the Powers Report, a study commissioned by the Enron Board
of Directors).
155. Id. at 70-71.
156. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
158. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandated that the SEC undertake a study of off-balance sheet
transactions and entities. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
159. See CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST EITIrnEs, INTERPRETATION No. 46 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2003). This interpretation requires that the "primary beneficiary" of a
variable interest entity consolidate such entity's assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses if such
"primary beneficiary" absorbs a majority of the entity's expected losses, receives a majority of
expected residual returns, or both. In most cases, however, the determination of the
apportionment of risks and rewards among the owners of the entity will require the exercise of
judgment and a discerning analysis of the substance of the arrangements among the entity and its
owners. One study estimated that the aforementioned Interpretation could add as much as $ 379
billion and $ 377 billion to the assets and liabilities, respectively, of the companies that make up
the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Off-Balance-Sheet Operations
Are Focus of New Regulations, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2003, at C5 (citing a report by Credit Suisse
First Boston).
160. After the facts surrounding the Enron transactions became known, the company restated
its earnings and stated that previously filed financial statements could not be relied upon. See
infra note 208. Some of the most egregious practices involving off-balance sheet entities have
occurred in the structured finance area through the use of synthetic leases. Off-balance sheet
entities are formed to purchase or construct property that, in turn, is leased to the corporation. In
substance, the leases essentially ensure that the lessor will attain an adequate return on investment,
and they place the residual risk on the lessee. The lease is structured so that the corporate lessee is
deemed the owner of the property for federal income tax purposes but not for financial accounting
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A manifest failure of various professionals to exercise judgment ;s more
to blame than a failure of accounting standards to reflect reality.
C. The Efficacy of a Principles-Based System
The premise that principles-based standards are more likely than
rules-based standards to capture the substance of a transaction is based
on two assumptions. First, a more searching analysis of the facts is pos-
sible under principles-based standards. Second, the substance of a trans-
action is transparent and consensus on such substance is readily
attainable. Both assumptions are subject to challenge. Moreover, pro-
ponents of a principles-based system of standards misunderstand the
fundamental distinction between rules-based and principles-based stan-
dards. Principles-based standards will not solve the accounting
problems that rules-based standards allegedly spawned.
1. FACT-FINDING
A common criticism of rules-based standards, and formalism in
general, is that they tend to ignore facts. The application of detailed
rules assumes a homogeneity of circumstances outside of the readily
ascertainable facts necessary to apply the detailed rules. 161 Principles-
based standards permit the assessment of more facts and, consequently,
will allow the substance of a transaction to become apparent - or at
least will prevent absurd results. However, the fact that principles-based
standards permit the assessment of more facts does not mean such
assessments will actually take place. Arguably, the facts that are
deemed important by rule-makers will be the facts that are examined
most closely in the application of principles. Certain facts will weigh
more heavily than others. Analogously to juries, the fact-finders may
focus on relatively few facts because those facts are the ones that "they
can readily understand or that appear most salient."' 62
2. SUBSTANCE: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS
Proponents of principles-based standards also assume that consen-
sus can be easily reached on the substance of a transaction or on the
purposes. The duality of ownership allows the corporation to deduct interest on debt and
dzpreciate the property for tax purposes, yet present its financial position to the public without the
attendant debt on its balance sheet. Enron employed a synthetic lease transaction to finance its
corporate headquarters. See Luppino, supra note 50, at 68.
161. See Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND. L.
REv. 57, 75-76 (2003).
162. Louis Kaplow, Rules vs. Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557, 566 n.14
(1992) (citing JoHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 143 (1927)).
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absurdity of a particular result. Accounting standards, like legislation,
both reflect reality and create their own reality. In most respects,
accounting standards attempt to accurately portray myriad business
transactions on which there is consensus as to what has occurred. Debt-
ors pay interest to creditors, employers pay wages to employees, and
retailers sells goods to customers. Most of us have little difficulty in
categorizing such transactions and explaining how they should be
accounted for. For example, common experience informs accountants
that a particular transaction is a sale. A transaction whereby the seller of
services is obligated to reciprocate with a like amount of expenditures to
the buyer for similar services - a round-trip transaction - is not a
sale.' 63 We know what a sale is and, call this transaction what you will,
it is not a sale.
However, in other cases, the standards "impose their own form on
the world. ' ' "6 A thing, transaction, or event is such because a rule or
statute says it is. On close examination, much of the fundamental under-
pinnings of generally accepted accounting principles may be so catego-
rized. Historical cost accounting is a case in point. Is it evident that
depreciation and the carrying value of assets should be based on their
historical cost? One can certainly make a case that fair market value
accounting is a better reflection of reality.' 65 Likewise, it is arguable
that the cash basis method of accounting is less prone to manipulation
and is more understandable to the average reader of financial state-
ments.' 66 After all, most of us run our personal affairs on such a basis.
There is no natural law of accounting that mandates that income is
163. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
164. Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 859,
865 (1982).
165. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Fannie Mae's Accounting Finds Critics Of Its Own, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 23, 2003, at CI (describing criticism aimed at Fannie Mae's accounting for
derivatives used to hedge its mortgage portfolio and positing that full fair market value accounting
of such instruments would present a truer picture of the firm's financial health); Peter J. Wallison,
Give Us Disclosure, Not Audits, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2003 (opining that the historical cost model
of accounting fails to capture the value of personnel in a knowledge-based economy). In fact,
attempts have been made to capture the value of intangible assets for management's use. See, e.g.,
R. Lee Brummet et. al., Human Resource Measurement - A Challenge for Accountants, 43 AccT.
REV. 217 (1968); James S. Hekimian & Curtis H. Jones, Put People on Your Balance Sheet,
H~av. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1967, at 105; Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, The Balanced
Scorecard - Measures That Drive Performance, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan. 1992, at 71. Fair market
value accounting has its critics. The insurance industry is adamantly against fair market value
accounting because, insurers assert, it would produce meaningless volatility in reported results.
See Christopher Oster, Insurers Cry Foul to Fair-Value Accounting, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2003,
at Cl.
166. Accrual based income has also been criticized for its failure to reflect economic profit
because, under generally accepted accounting principles, a rate of return on equity is not imputed.
The true economic profit earned by a firm is the return earned in excess of risk-free rate of return.
See Robert L. Bartley, Economic Profit vs. Accounting Profit, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2003, at A17;
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earned prior to receipt or that probable, but future losses, should be
accrued.
Despite the consternation over the perceived abuses of off-balance
sheet entities that prominently figured in Enron's demise, disagreements
exist about whether consolidation accounting accurately portrays reality.
This is ironic in that criticisms directed at Enron's accounting for its
SPVs were based on the fact that the standards somehow permitted the
entities to avoid consolidation. A study of corporate failures in Australia
had this to say about consolidation accounting:
[C]onsolidation accounting has another, less obvious yet insidious
result, it purposely conceals and buries subsidiary information within
the group's consolidation, hiding both the enlightening and damaging
aspects of subsidiary performance within the whole .... Consolida-
tion techniques are the product of relying on economic form over
legal form and financial substance. They obfuscate, confuse, and
conceal data that might normally be available to users of financial
statements, and may serve to hide data from shareholders and credi-
tors that is damaging or otherwise disparaging. . . .Consolidation
accounting purports to represent a fictional legal structure which by
its very nature "lacks legal capacity generally to exercise property
rights, sue or be sued, incur physical or financial damage or impose it
upon others; the statements contradict the legal, social and financial
essence which their constituent corporations enjoy."'
167
Critics of rules-based standards believe that "bad results" arising
from the application of such rules are readily ascertainable and that the
"right results" are discoverable through a more judicious examination of
the facts. This presumes too much. Tax practitioners have had consid-
erable experience with substance versus form issues and their exper-
iences should make accountants reticent about inviting liberal use of
such a doctrine into their world.
Courts have longed applied a substance versus form analysis in
interpreting and applying the tax law. 168 The Supreme Court, in Greg-
G. Bennett Stewart III, Why Smart Managers Do Dumb Things, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2003, at
A 16.
167. Rodriquez, supra note 107, at 470 (citing to, and quoting from, F.L. CLARKE ET AL.,
CORPORATE COLLAPSE, REGULATORY, ACCOUNTING, AND ETHICAL FAILURE (1997)).
168. Issues of economic substance are not exclusively raised in litigation. For example, the
regulations that govern the registration of tax shelters define a transaction that has as a significant
purpose of its structure the avoidance or evasion of federal income taxes to include transactions
that lack economic substance. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(b)(1) (2000). The
regulations describe a transaction that lacks economic purpose as a transaction with reasonably
expected pre-tax profit, determined on a present value basis, that is insignificant relative to the
expected present value of net federal income savings from the transaction. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.611 l-2T(b)(3) (2000).
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ory v. Helvering,169  created the doctrine when it affirmed the Second
Circuit's decision that the taxpayer was not entitled to a statutory benefit
because while the taxpayer, in form, met the statutory requirements at
issue, the substance of the transaction was altogether different and not
within the purpose of the statute. 70 In 1978, the Court stated that it "has
never regarded the simple expedient of drawing up papers as controlling
for tax purposes when the objective economic realities are to the
contrary." '17 1
The doctrine has spawned numerous tests and ancillary doctrines,
such as the economic substance doctrine and the step-transaction doc-
trine. 172  Application of the doctrines has caused the courts to inquire
into various attributes of particular transactions, including whether the
expected returns on an investment, exclusive of tax benefits, are suffi-
cient, and the subjective motivation for the transaction. 173  Two com-
mentators have discerned four general principles that have emerged
from the case law. First, the courts will respect the form of a transaction
if its substance agrees with its form.1 74  Second, if the substance of
transaction cannot be reconciled with its form, the courts will not respect
the form of the transaction. 7 5 Third, if the substance of the transaction
agrees with its form, and the substance of the transaction can be
recharacterized, the courts will respect the form of the transaction if
none of the plausible recharacterizations better represents the transac-
tion's substance.17 6 Finally, if the transaction's form arguably agrees
with its substance but more reasonably does not, the courts will not
respect the form of the transaction unless a business purpose exists for
the form chosen.
177
These common law doctrines, all attempting to ascertain the sub-
169. 293 U.S. 465 (1935), affig Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
170. Id. The Court made earlier statements regarding the primacy of substance over form, but
Gregory remains the landmark case in the area. See, e.g., Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 242
(1924); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921).
171. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978). In this case, the Court did
not disturb the taxpayer's treatment of a sale-leaseback transaction and acknowledged that it is
often difficult to peel away the form of a transaction to reveal its substance.
172. The economic substance doctrine requires that a transaction have a reasonable expectation
of some substantial pre-tax economic profit and have a business purpose. See generally Joseph
Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 5 (2000). The step transaction
doctrine is used to treat a series of transactions as a single transaction if the separate transactions
are integrated, interdependent, and focused toward a single result. See Ray A. Knight & Lee G.
Knight, Substance over Form: The Cornerstone of Our Tax System or a Lethal Weapon in the
IRS's Arsenal?, 8 AKRON TAx J. 91, 100-01 (1991).
173. See Bankman, supra note 171, at 13-29.
174. See Knight &Knight, supra note 171, at 106.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 106-07.
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stance of a transaction or series of transactions, have been subject to
harsh criticism on several grounds. Ascertainment of the substance of a
transaction is possible in situations where the statutory strictures apply
to facts or terms with a clear extra-statutory meaning - what one com-
mentator refers to as "the Code following life."' 7 8 In such cases, the
basic terms of the transaction are imported into the statute. Examples
would include the definitions of a sale, compensation, and a fine. How-
ever, statutes are also "creatures of art" that create their own reality.'79
If the Internal Revenue Code defines a transaction in a certain fashion,
then the statutory rules have created the substance to which the transac-
tion's form supposedly adheres.
Courts, in order to go beyond the statutory text, have resorted to the
legislative purpose of the statute in question. However, as one noted
commentator stated, a legislature's purpose "is largely a fiction in hard
cases" and risks ambiguity, overinclusiveness, and underinclusive-
ness.' 80 The application of the four general principles set forth by
Knight and Knight supports this criticism. Assuming arguendo that
courts should diligently inquire about the substance of a transaction, in
order to do so they must delve into a taxpayer's subjective motivation
for a transaction and determine how much of pre-tax return is enough to
lend economic substance to a transaction.181 Moreover, courts have had
to grapple with whether legislatively intentioned benefits should be
exempted from the reach of the doctrines. For example, the choice of
entity in which business is conducted can have dramatic tax conse-
quences. The partnership form of business offers certain advantages not
available to the corporate form. ' 82 Choosing such a form for tax reasons
178. See Isenbergh, supra note 164, at 864-65.
179. Id. at 865.
180. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. Rav. 405,
433 (1989).
181. Inquiry into a taxpayer's subjective motivation could result in different treatment for
identical transactions if, on the one hand, a transaction is closely related to routine business
operations and, by happenstance, exploits a so-called "loophole" is respected and an identical
transaction, entered into purposefully to exploit such "loophole," is not. In a high profile case, the
IRS is seeking $75 million from the former partners of Long-Term Capital Management. The IRS
alleges that the firm, with the aid of three Nobel Prize winning economists, entered into a series of
complex transactions for the sole purpose of creating tax deductions. See Kara Scannell, As
LTCM Trial Begins, It Offers an Inside Peek at Executives and Their Taxes, WALL ST. J., June 24,
2003, at Cl. The tax shelter registration regulations make similar exceptions. A transaction that
is structured to produce federal income tax benefits as an important part of its intended results is
exempted from the registration if (1) the transaction occurs in the ordinary course of business in a
form consistent with customary commercial practice; and (2) there is a long-standing and
generally accepted understanding that the expected tax benefits are allowable under the Internal
Revenue Code for substantially similar transactions. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-
2T(b)(4)(i)-(ii) (2000).
182. Federal income taxes are not imposed on partnerships. Instead, the income or loss
11972004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1161
alone will not subject the taxpayer to challenge. 18 3 In fact, the prolifera-
tion of limited liability companies is due in great part to recent favorable
tax developments concerning choice of entity.
184
Of course, there are significant differences between enforcement of
tax accounting rules and generally accepted accounting principles.
However, those differences do little to engender much confidence that
the accounting profession will have any more success than the tax bar
and the courts in ascertaining the economic substance of transaction.
Attaining consensus on the substance of a transaction for tax purposes
has proved enormously vexing despite the fact that tax disputes have
certain amenable characteristics: The parties' objectives are transparent;
they are placed in adversarial relationship; and an impartial arbiter ren-
ders decisions. These characteristics are absent from accounting dis-
putes, and to assume that the accounting profession would have better
success than the tax bar is fanciful.
In matters of taxation, a "bad" result, from the taxing jurisdiction's
standpoint, is obvious - reduction of tax liabilities. Such is not the
generated by the partnership is reported by the partners in accordance with their interests in the
partnership. In contrast, corporations, with certain exceptions, are taxed at the entity level.
Corporations meeting certain statutory requirements could elect to be taxed as S corporations.
These corporations are not subject to tax at the entity level. However, the partnership form offers
many advantages over S corporations. Partnerships offer, inter alia, more flexibility in capital
structure and income allocation. Moreover, partnerships offer a new entrant the ability to step up
the basis of the assets to reflect the purchase price for the acquired interest. For an overview of
the advantages of the partnership form, see Matthew A. Melone, Corporate Partnering: The
Applicability of Subchapter K in a Subchapter C World, 15 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX 229 (1998).
183. For state tax purposes, the form in which business is transacted is often subject to
challenge. Presently, significant state tax dollars are at issue with respect to the use of Delaware
holding companies to hold intangible assets. Many corporations have transferred valuable
intangible assets to Delaware subsidiaries. Such subsidiaries, in turn, charge other operating
subsidiaries royalties for the use of such intangibles. Thus income, for state income tax purposes,
is shifted to Delaware where it is exempt from tax. See Carrick Mollenkamp & Glenn R.
Simpson, WorldCom Tax Strategy May Have Helped It Save Millions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14,
2003, at Cl. It is doubtful that such a structure would be subject to challenge if the intangibles
were originally held in Delaware corporate solution and operational activities were later
incorporated in other states. It is not so clear that transferring the intangibles to a Delaware
corporation changes the substance of the transaction.
184. Limited liability companies are entities formed under state law that, depending on state
law, provides significant liability insulation for the owners of the entity. The business community
was slow in adopting this form of business for several reasons, not the least of which was that the
federal income tax status of these entities was uncertain. Final regulations - the "check-the-box
regulations" - were issued in 1996 and provide assurance that these entities would be taxed as
partnerships. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 (1996); 301.7701-2 (1999); 301.7701-3
(1999). Prior to the issuance of these regulations, a four-factor test was applied to determine
whether the entity in question should be taxed as a corporation. See generally Larry E. Ribstein &
Mark A. Sargent, Check-the-Box and Beyond: The Future of Limited Liability Entities, 52 Bus.
LAW. 605 (1997). The corporate form offers similar, if not better, liability protection and
administrative costs are usually a minor factor. Arguably, the determining factor in the decision to
form a limited liability company is the tax status of such entity.
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case with generally accepted accounting principles. In certain cases,
companies wish to report increased earnings, but in other circumstances
reduced earnings are preferred.1 85 Companies' reporting goals are not
homogeneous and are often driven by analysts' expectations, compensa-
tion targets, and other forces that defy generalization for what the skepti-
cal eye should be on the lookout.
The relationship between the taxpayer and the taxing authority is
adversarial. The relationship between a company and its auditor is,
instead, client and professional. This is a significant difference about
which more will be said later in this work.186 Finally, tax disputes have
an objective arbiter at the ready - the courts - that is lacking in the
accounting realm. Even if the SEC were ready, willing, and able to take
on such a function, it would prove unworkable. 87 Accounting disputes,
unlike tax disputes, cannot be resolved over extended periods of time.
Restatement of earnings, as a regular occurrence, will wreak havoc on
the securities markets.
3. THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN RULES AND PRINCIPLES:
EX ANTE OR EX POST?
Critics of rules-based standards reserve special vitriol for "bright-
line" tests, "on-off switches," and frequent scope and transition excep-
tions. 188 Principles-based standards, assert such critics, would eliminate,
or at least mitigate, the elevation of form over substance that is too com-
mon under the present system. However, the focus on whether rules are
complex, contain threshold tests, and are subject to numerous exceptions
misses the fundamental distinction between rules and principles. Rules
are merely an attempt to provide ex ante guidance, whereby principles
require ex post determinations of what is or is not permissible. The
application of rules requires that the facts be determined, but otherwise
the task of determining what is or is not permissible has been performed
in advance. On the other hand, principles require the determination of
facts, and a separate and contemporaneous inquiry into what is or is not
permissible is also required.
This distinction between rules-based and principles-based standards
lays bare several weaknesses in the proposals for less of the former and
more of the latter. First, rules are not necessarily more complex than
principles. The costs of compliance in a rules-based system are overesti-
mated and the costs of compliance in a principles-based system are
185. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of earnings smoothing.
186. See infra notes 222-51 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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underestimated. Second, whether guidance should take the form of rules
or principles depends on several factors. One is not inherently superior
or inferior to the other and, on balance, the present system is not bad.
Third, proponents ignore the role of precedent in a principles-based sys-
tem. The present regulatory and audit model is inadequate in this
respect.
a. Complexity: A Chimera
A common criticism of the current system is that complex rules,
laden with numerous thresholds and exceptions, have contributed to
standards overload and have unduly increased the expense of accounting
and reporting for many transactions. 189  However, replacing such rules
with principles-based standards will not necessarily reduce complexity.
Broad, principles-based standards will, ex ante, obviously appear to be
less complex. In application, however, such principles-based standards
may be as complex, or in many cases, more complex. 190
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 13, Accounting
for Leases, provides a good example of an often-criticized rules-based
standard.' 9 ' Four bright-line tests exist for the classification of a lease
as either an operating lease or a capital lease. A lease is treated as a
capital lease if the lease transfers ownership to the lessee at the end of
the lease term; contains a bargain purchase option; its term equals or
exceeds seventy-five percent of the economic life of the property; or the
present value of the minimum lease payments equals or exceeds ninety
percent of the fair value of the lease property.' 92 The FASB has
decided, ex ante, that these four factors are relevant in making the dis-
tinction between operating and capital leases. Assume that a lessor and
lessee purposefully structure a lease to barely fail one of the tests so that
the lease is classified as an operating lease. For example, assume that
189. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
190. Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, famously opposes the application of
detailed rules in setting monetary policy. He believes that "[r]ules by their nature are simple.
They cannot substitute for risk-management paradigms." Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan
Argues Against Strict Rules for Fed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2003, at C1. Greenspan's position is
based on the premise that the economy is too complex to be managed by adherence to detailed
rules. Given the stakes involved, this position may be justified when dealing with monetary
policy but not accounting standards.
191. This standard was specifically mentioned in the SEC report mandated by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Moreover, much of the consternation over
special purpose entities and off-balance sheet accounting treatment has arisen with respect to lease
transactions, and more specifically, "synthetic leases." See supra note 160.
192. ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES, STATEMENT OF FNANcIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 13
§ 7 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1976). Additional rules are provided for leases of real estate.
See id. § 26.
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the present value of the future lease payments amount to eighty-eight
percent of the fair market value of the asset.
A principles-based standard for classifying leases would avoid such
hard and fast thresholds and direct the parties to examine whether, under
all the facts and circumstances, the lessor or lessee retains the benefits
and burdens of ownership. The argument that this broad standard will
yield a more informed result than that arising from the application of the
detailed rules in Statement of Accounting Standards No. 13 must be
based on the premise that the rule either places undue focus on the per-
centage of fair market value test, ignores other factors that should be
considered, or both. Application of such a principles-based standard
will be more complex than the application of the rules-based standard
because it will either have to assign varying weights to the factors and
come up with an individualized assessment of what percentage of fair
market value is tolerable, or it must look to other factors not presently
considered. Most likely, both will be necessary. The problem of stan-
dards overload is not caused by rules. This problem will exist whether a
standard is rules-based or principles-based.193 The crux of the matter is
whether one prefers to navigate the terrain ex ante or ex post.1 94
In comparison with principles-based standards, rules-based stan-
dards are costly to promulgate because rules-based standards specify in
advance, and with particularity, the application of a principle in various
contexts. For example, it would be more costly for the FASB to issue a
standard addressing off-balance sheet accounting treatment that
attempted to consider all foreseeable permutations in the structure of
such arrangements than if the FASB issued a principles-based standard
that required consolidation of all entities over which the investor exer-
cises managerial control. However, the principles-based standard would
generate greater costs of advice and compliance because each arrange-
ment would be resolved individually. Moreover, principles-based stan-
dards would likely result in less predictability and comparability. 195
Although in a principles-based system, precedent can mitigate the loss
of predictability inherent in such standards, it is unlikely to have such an
effect in the application of accounting standards.1 96
193. One scholar has developed the concept of a "rule equivalent to a standard" to support the
notion that rules are not inherently more complex than principles. A rule can be written
incorporating the factors that are used in the application of a principle. Consequently, the rules-
based standard and the principles-based standard should yield similar results. See Kaplow, supra
note 162, at 586-90.
194. A rules-based system will incur greater promulgation costs because the rule-makers need
to examine, ex ante, various permutations of a transaction. Whether additional promulgation costs
are justified depends on several factors. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
196. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
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b. The Economic Case
Whether rules-based or principles-based standards are more cost
effective depends, to a great extent, on the frequency of the transactions
subject to the standards.197 The issues raised by a commonplace transac-
tion are best resolved wholesale by enacting a rule. The up-front pro-
mulgation costs may be spread over numerous transactions, thereby
making it likely that such costs are less than those that would be
incurred in a case-by-case determination. 98 Professor Kaplow refers to
the case of need-based financial aid as an example. 199 Generally, the
definition of "need" is specified in advance by detailed rules. Because
the number of applicants is great, an ex ante determination of the factors
to apply and their relative weight is efficient despite the fact that a more
nuanced, ex-post analysis may, on occasion, result in substantially dif-
ferent awards.2 0
Rules-based standards, therefore, should not be deemed deficient
per se. In many cases they are an efficient way of dealing with fre-
quently recurring issues. Statement of Financial Accounting Standard
No. 13 is a case in point. Lease transactions are ubiquitous. In the vast
majority of cases, whether a lease is, in substance, what it purports to be
will turn on four factors deemed relevant by the standard. If the existing
standards yield anomalous results in too many cases, then the rules
should be fixed, not scrapped. If, however, the rules yield the "wrong"
result with respect to the occasional transaction, then other mechanisms
should be considered, which, for the most part, are available.0 '
Is it possible that the benefits of elevating substance over form,
through the use of broad, principles-based standards, exceed any con-
ceivable increase in application costs? Such a possibility is highly
unlikely for two reasons. First, the added value of alternatively charac-
terizing most transactions in accordance with their so-called substance is
dubious. Second, the value placed on the existence of this benefit
197. See Kaplow, supra note 162, at 563-64.
198. In the event previous applications of principles-based standards have established
precedent for future application, the costs of knowing the rules should not exceed the costs of
applying a principles-based standard.
199. See Kaplow, supra note 162, at 594 n.100.
200. Professor Kaplow actually uses the financial aid example to make the point that there is
no certainty that a case-by-case application of broad principles will consider all the subtleties of a
particular case. However, even assuming that individual cases are examined thoroughly, the
variation in most awards will not differ significantly from the result derived from applying the
rules. If such were the case, the response should be to revise the rules, not scrap them.
201. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text. If certain factors, ignored by the rule in
question, are highly particularized, there is no reason that the rules should be scrapped. The rules
may work well, and an ex post analysis of those particularized factors may provide the fix. A
standard need not be exclusively rules- or principles-based.
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falsely presupposes that a principles-based system has immunity from
opportunistic behavior.
As discussed earlier in this Article, a standard may incorporate
commonly understood concepts in which case it attempts to reflect a
reality that is defined by constituencies other than the standard setters.2 °2
Alternatively, a standard may create its own reality by defining terms for
its own purposes.2 °3 In the latter case, attempts at discerning the "true"
substance are of dubious benefit - and perhaps dubious validity.
Again, lease transactions offer a good example.
Leases are a legal construct. Well-established notions of property
law set forth the rights and burdens of the holder of the residual property
rights and the holder of the possessory interest. Most businesspersons,
and many consumers, can easily distinguish between a sale and a lease.
However, it is also possible to structure a transaction as a lease that
contains certain attributes that would make one question whether the
transaction is what it purports to be. For example, a lease may automati-
cally transfer ownership to the lessee at the end of the lease term. How
much time and effort are expended in quieting one's unease should
depend on the stakes involved and how much better an alternative classi-
fication purports to capture reality.
Whether a transaction is a lease or sale has significant legal conse-
quences. For federal income tax purposes, the characterization of the
transaction will determine whether the lessor or lessee may depreciate
the asset, whether the lessor has a gain or loss on a sale of the asset, and
whether the lease obligation is a debt that generates interest income and
expense to the parties. Likewise, the characterization of the transaction
will have implication for other lenders, particularly in the event of bank-
ruptcy. If the transaction is recast as a sale, then the putative lessor is a
creditor whose position vis-e-vis other claimants to the collateral will
depend upon whether steps were taken to perfect a security interest.
2°
In such circumstances, the time and effort expended to ascertain the sub-
stance of the transaction arguably yield some tangible benefit.
The purpose of accounting is to provide timely and relevant infor-
mation to management, investors, creditors, and other interested third
parties. Assume in a given "hard case," reasonable auditors come to the
conclusion that, given all the facts and circumstances, a lease transaction
in question should be treated as a sale by the lessor and a purchase by
the lessee despite the fact that the transaction fails all four "bright-line"
202. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
204. See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301 (2002).
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tests set forth in Statement of Accounting Standards No. 13. °5 It is dif-
ficult to see how reality is better reflected by an ex post determination
that sets the threshold for capital lease treatment at seventy-two percent
of the economic life of the asset or eighty-seven percent of the fair mar-
ket value of the asset, or some other such threshold that the particular
facts of this case seemingly yields.2 06 A capital lease is what the stan-
dards say it is.207 The accounting standards are - or should be -
known by readers of the financial statements. They can draw their own
conclusions.
Bear in mind that differences in results between the application of
principles-based standards and rule-based standards will come in the
"hard cases." In the vast majority of cases, a transaction will fit com-
fortably within or without a reasonably drafted rule. If not, then the
rule's content is more the problem than the existence of the rule itself.
In egregious cases, the accounting and auditing professions already pos-
sess the tools to recast the transactions. 0 8 In fact, many of the so-called
"hard cases" would have fit nicely within existing rules had not manage-
ment committed outright fraud or failed to disclose all relevant informa-
tion.2"9 The "hard cases" are such because different, yet reasonable,
conclusions may be drawn about the transactions.
c. Precedent
Complex rules are sometimes overinclusive or underinclusive. As
such, they tolerate opportunistic exploitation of their complexity to
cause transactions that, in spirit, should fall within the rules' ambit to
escape their reach, and vice-versa. However, replacing such rules with
principles-based standards will not necessarily reduce the opportunities
for those so inclined to "game" the system. Arguments to the contrary
underestimate the effect of precedent in a principles-based system.
Precedents established under such a system create thresholds that, like
rules, are subject to exploitation. Moreover, under the present audit
model, such precedent will be established without the benefit of a credi-
ble arbiter.
205. See supra note 191.
206. Kaplow questions whether ex post decision makers consider all relevant factors or rather
focus only on certain factors that they deem critical. See Kaplow, supra note 162, at 565-66.
207. Arguably, to better reflect reality, the accounting treatment should mirror the
characterization given to a transaction by a court or regulator for other purposes. This would
cause the accounting standards to reflect "life" as opposed to creating their own reality.
208. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
209. For example, once all the circumstances came to light concerning Enron's off-balance
sheet transactions, Arthur Andersen required the company to restate its results with such entities
consolidated. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Floyd Norris, In New Filing, Enron Reports Debt
Squeeze, N.Y. TILMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at Cl.
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1. OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR
The assertion that a rule is prone to overinclusivity or underin-
clusivity implies that certain factors necessary in the application of the
rule are either not relevant, not accorded appropriate weight, or are
ignored. In the cases where the factor or factors in question are not
relevant or not appropriately weighted, the easy solution is to fix the
rule. However, many substance versus form disputes are based on the
assertion that certain factors germane to the resolution of the issue at
hand are ignored under a rules-based system.
In a principles-based system, once the additional factors that are
deemed relevant are considered, a precedent is created. Such precedent,
in effect, becomes a new rule just as susceptible to exploitation as an ex
ante promulgation. With respect to legal issues, "an accumulation of
precedents dealing with the same question may create a rule of law hav-
ing the same force as an explicit statutory rule."2 10 Although the prece-
dential value of previous applications of accounting rules does not
approach the value of legal precedent, it is inconceivable that prior deci-
sions dealing with similar issues will not carry substantial weight.211
Large accounting firms expend enormous effort to create "knowledge
databases," the purpose of which is to provide the firms' professionals
with the benefit of the firms' past experience in resolving an issue.
Consequently, a principles-based standard does not eliminate the
ability to structure transactions to obtain desirable accounting results. If
the application of a principles-based standard is justified by reference to
certain factors deemed relevant, then those factors become susceptible to
manipulation. For example, assume that an accounting standard dealing
with consolidation of investee entities by the investor states that the
exercise of control over the investee by the investor mandates consolida-
tion.212 Control is not defined but is instead to be determined by all the
facts and circumstances.
Assume further that in a particularly difficult case, one of the facts
considered important is that the investor is a significant customer of the
investee. This fact favored the decision to consolidate despite the fact
that investor owned a significant, but not a majority, stake of the equity
of the investee entity. Once the basis for the decision is known, some-
one inclined to avoid consolidation will make the effort to structure a
210. Kaplow, supra note 167, at 577 n.46 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW § 20.1, at 539 (4th ed. 1992)).
211. Confidentiality rules limit the dissemination of client information. See CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 65, § 301, Rule 301. Moreover, competitive pressures will,
in all likelihood, limit the sharing of information among accounting firms.
212. See supra notes 140-150 and accompanying text for a discussion of consolidation
accounting.
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transaction to differentiate it from the prior transaction. The transaction
may be structured so that the investor owns less equity outright or does
less business with the investee. The roadmap is there - whether by rule
or past applications.
The hard cases will be structured transactions. Transactions that
accidentally happen to have favorable but seemingly unintended conse-
quences are few. Past decisions rarely pronounce clear-cut thresholds or
bright-lines, as rules often do. Therefore, it is arguable that the benefits
of structured transactions are less certain than under a system of rules-
based standards. Firms, less certain of the outcome, will be less inclined
to incur the costs of structured transactions. The evidence, however,
does not support such optimism. In fact, firms may become emboldened
by the existence of principles-based standards.
Studies of aggressive reporting practices have shown that even pre-
cise standards are less effective in constraining aggressive reporting if
managers have wide latitude in interpreting the evidence related to the
standard.213 Imprecision in the standards has been shown to increase the
aggressiveness of reporting. Auditors tended to allow their clients to
make more aggressive reporting choices when the precedents for doing
so were mixed.2 14 Only in situations where the precedents unanimously
favored one choice did auditors tend to require the client to report in a
211particular manner. Moreover, poor choice of precedent was exhibited
in cases where the choice supported the client's position.21 6 The recent
spate of accounting scandals supports these findings. As discussed ear-
lier, most of the scandals did not result from exploitation of rules but
from misapplication of broad, well-established, principles.21" Finally,
even a casual observer of the federal income tax landscape cannot help
but notice that tax shelters continue to proliferate. Despite the arsenal of
common law doctrines employed by the courts,21 8 the possibility of sub-
stantial penalties, 2 9 and an adversarial setting, the attempts to find so-
called loopholes go on unabated. So long as the incentives are in place,
neither rules nor principles will stem such attempts.
213. See Nelson, supra note 78, at 94-97.
214. Id. at 95-98.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
219. See generally I.R.C. § 6662 (2002) (imposing a twenty percent penalty for actions
including negligence and substantial understatement of income tax); I.R.C. § 6663 (2002)
(imposing a seventy-five percent penalty for the portion of the underpayment of tax attributable to
fraud).
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2. THE ARBITER
Two fundamental distinctions may be made between the applica-
tion of broad principles-based standards and rules-based standards. The
first concerns when decisions are made, and the second addresses the
individual decision-makers. As discussed above, the application of
broad principles entails ex post decision-making in contrast to the ex
ante nature of rules-based systems. 22 0 Moreover, a rules-based system
relies heavily on a regulatory-type body to promulgate such rules. A
principles-based system requires an arbiter to develop a body of rules as
particular situations arise. The arbiter, in effect, puts "flesh on the
bones" through an ever-expanding body of precedent. Perhaps the most
significant weakness in the employment of principles-based system of
accounting standards is the lack of a credible arbiter.
Ex post resolution of issues that arise in the application of account-
ing standards will, under the present regulatory framework, fall to the
accounting profession. The SEC is not in a position to serve as a timely
arbiter. The SEC received an aggregate of $2.1 trillion in public offer-
ing filings and 13,460 annual reports in the fiscal year ended September
30, 1999.11 Unlike tax disputes, accounting issues must be resolved
prior to the release of the issuer's financial statements.222 The capital
markets will not tolerate regular earnings restatements. The courts, for
similar reasons, are not well situated to resolve such issues.
Auditors are legally and ethically required to be independent.
However, under the present audit model, auditors cannot achieve a level
of independence in fact or appearance that ensures that they will exer-
cise the proper judgment and discretion in the application of broad prin-
ciples-based accounting standards. There are two reasons for this
conclusion. First, the present relationship between auditors and the
reporting firm is a client relationship. Recent regulatory and legislative
developments in this area have not changed that fact. Second, so long as
incentives for aggressive accounting exist, auditors will be pressured to
agree with their clients' management. It is too early to predict whether
the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will materially alter manage-
ment's incentives, but pessimism in this respect would not be misplaced.
220. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
221. See Mark Allan Wordan, Securities Regulation: Protecting Auditor Independence from
Non-Audit Services - An Evolving Standard, 55 OaLA. L. Rav. 513, 515 (2002).
222. Tax disputes often take years to work their way through the system. After exhausting
administrative procedures, disputes are often tied up in the courts for years. Although the
resolution of a tax dispute often impacts the financial statements, liability reserves are established,
and disclosure is provided for significant disputes. Consequently, the resolution of the dispute
does not require restatement of prior years' financial statements. In effect, the tax dispute is
accounted for as a contingent liability.
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(a) Independence
Congress, in enacting the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, placed the responsibility of auditing the financial
statements of registrant companies on the accounting profession.223 In
order to carry out their function, accounting firms that audit such finan-
cial statements must be independent.22 4  Thus, as recognized by the
Supreme Court and the accounting profession itself, auditors hold a
position of public trust.225 In theory, the accounting profession is well
placed to perform the role of independent arbiter with respect to the
application of accounting standards. Critical to the accounting profes-
sion's ability to exercise the impartial judgment necessary to effectively
fulfill this role is the independence requirement. Unfortunately, with
respect to independence, practice departs too far from theory.
The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct states that members
"should maintain objectivity and be free of conflicts of interests in dis-
charging professional responsibilities" and should be "independent in
fact and appearance when providing auditing and other attestation ser-
vices. '  Independence requirements, until the issuance of new SEC
regulations in 2000, were enforced by various SEC and professional
rules.
Prior to the 2000 amendments, the SEC last amended the auditor
independence rules in 1983, despite the fact that the accounting profes-
sion had dramatically changed.227  The major accounting firms today
barely resemble those of twenty years ago. From 1993 to 1999, as their
audit revenues grew at an annual rate of nine percent, accounting firms'
revenues from non-audit services increased at an annual rate of twenty-
223. Consideration was given to the creation of a group of government auditors and to federal
licensing of auditors. See 65 Fed. Reg. 43,148, 43,150 (July 12, 2000).
224. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (2000). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the
accounting profession, due to the SEC's inability to review the vast number of filings it receives,
is primarily responsible for the integrity of the financial information companies submit to the
SEC. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1979).
225. In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984), the Supreme Court stated
that "[b]y certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the
independent auditor assumes a position of public responsibility." This responsibility "demands
that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete
fidelity to the public trust." Id. at 817-18. The Court, moreover, distinguished the role of auditor
from that of an attorney, stating that the auditor should be disinterested. Id. at 818.
226. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 65, § 55, Art. IV, para. 3.
227. In 1997, the SEC and the AICPA jointly formed the Independence Standard Board.
Composed of four members from the accounting profession and four from business and finance,
the Independence Standard Board was charged with developing a conceptual framework for
independence regulation. See William T. Allen & Arthur Siegel, Conflicts of Interest in Corporate
and Securities Law: Threats and Safeguards in the Determination of Auditor Independence, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 519, 525 (2002). The SEC abandoned its commitment to the Independence
Standard Board, and it was dissolved in July 2001. Id.
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six percent. 22 8 By the end of the decade, approximately fifty percent of
the Big Five public accounting firms' revenues were generated from
non-audit services.2 29 In comparison, such revenues accounted for
approximately thirteen percent of the firms' revenues in the early
1980s. 23 0 Management of the major accounting firms recognized the
limits to the growth of the auditing business while, at the same time,
acknowledged the vast potential in consulting services, particularly
information technology.23 I The AICPA itself encouraged such trends.232
The accounting profession and the SEC have taken a pragmatic,
rather than dogmatic, approach to auditor independence and non-audit
services.23 3  One school of thought posits that all non-audit services
should be banned by the independence requirement. Supporters of an
exclusionary ban believe that by providing such services, the audit firn
serves both management and the investing public, thereby creating a
conflict in appearance and, possibly, in fact. A second school of thought
believes that many non-audit services provide a service to the public.23 4
228. See Worden, supra note 220, at 516-17.
229. Id. at 517. Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte &
Touche, and KPMG were the Big Five public accounting firms. After the demise of Arthur
Andersen as a result of its role in the Enron scandal, the remaining firms are known as the Big
Four - or derisively as The Final Four.
230. A report prepared by Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering on the WorldCom fraud highlights the
severe pricing pressure on the audit profession and the concomitant impetus to sell more lucrative
services. Moreover, the report also asserts that such pricing pressures have led to less rigorous
audits. See Cassell Bryan-Low, WorldCom's Auditors Took Shortcuts, WALL ST. J., July 23,
2003, at C9.
231. The push into consulting services caused much turmoil within some of the firms with
respect to compensation and governance. Arthur Andersen and its consulting practice parted ways
amid much acrimony. See Reed Abelson, After Andersen War, Accountants Think Hard About
Consulting, N.Y. TuvEs, Aug., 9, 2000, at Cl. See also Cassell Bryan-Low, Deloitte Chief
Wrestles to Get Consultants Back in Firms, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2003, at Cl.
232. See MAKE AUDITS PAY: LEVERAGING THE AUDIT INTO CONSULTING SERVICES (Am. Inst.
of Certified Pub. Accountants 1999).
233. The provision of non-audit services are but one of many factors that determine whether an
auditor is independent in fact and appearance. Financial and employment relationships between
the auditors and client are two significant factors. These factors, however, have proven relatively
uncontroversial in comparison to the issues raised by the provision of non-audit services.
Occasionally, however, certain business relationships have led to controversy. See Jonathan Weil,
Freddie Mac's Charity Case, WALL ST. J. , July 21, 2003, at C I (reporting that the lead partner on
the audit of Freddie Mac served on the board of a charity to which the company made significant
contributions).
234. In recent years, the major public accounting firms have embroiled themselves in disputes
as a result of services or arrangements that seemingly bear little relation to audit efficiency. Some
of the more questionable practices have involved marketing or client referral arrangements
whereby the audit client referred business to the audit fim or vice versa. Others involved the
marketing of tax shelters to audit client or, in some cases, to the executives of the audit clients.
See, e.g., Cassell Bryan-Low & Carrick Mollenkamp, Wachovia, KPMG Face SEC Probe over
Referrals, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2003, at A3; Cassell Bryan-Low, KPMG's E-Mails Pointed to
Concerns over Tax Shelters, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2003; Cassell Bryan-Low, Did Ties That Bind
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Such services enable the auditor to obtain a deeper knowledge of the
client's operations and controls, thereby leading to improved audit effi-
ciency. Moreover, such services allow the audit firm to suggest
improvements in client operations. The SEC subscribes, in great part, to
this school of thought.
The SEC adopted a final rule in 2000 that limited, rather than
banned, non-audit services. The rule specifically set forth several pro-
hibited situations and relationships. Circumstances not specifically
addressed are tested under the existing general standard for indepen-
dence based on all the facts and circumstances. 5 With certain excep-
tions, the final rule prohibits auditors from providing bookkeeping
services, operating, supervising, or designing client financial informa-
tion systems, appraisal and valuation opinions, internal audit services
exceeding certain thresholds, management functions, human resource
services, broker-dealer services, and legal services.23 6 Moreover, the
rules require the client to disclose audit and non-audit fees billed by the
auditor.237  A recent dispute about the fee disclosure rule, however,
causes one to doubt the efficacy of this requirement.238
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act enumerated several services that auditors
may not provide to audit clients.239 The list of services prohibited by the
Act mirror those listed in the SEC rule. However, the legislation elimi-
nated the numerous exceptions that exist in the final rule.24 ° Moreover,
the Act also requires that any non-audit service that is not prohibited,
including tax services, must by approved in advance by the client's audit
Also Blind KPMG, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2003, at Cl; Patrick McGeehan, Sprint's Holders
Rumbling over Conflicts by Auditor, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at Cl.
235. The general standard of auditor independence states that an accountant is not independent
"if the accountant . .. or a reasonable investor with knowledge of all relevant facts and
circumstances would conclude that the accountant is not ... capable of exercising objective and
impartial judgment on all issues ...." 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) (2001).
236. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(i)-(ix) (2001).
237. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2001).
238. HealthSouth Corp. classified $2.39 million in payments to Ernst & Young as "audit-
related fees." The company later acknowledged that approximately $1.3 million included in the
"audit-related" figure was for janitorial service - basically operational inspections to determine
the cleanliness of company's facilities and the like. The company relied on Ernst & Young for the
classification. A spokesperson for Ernst & Young stated that "[t]he audit-related category is not
limited to services related to the financial statement audit per se." See Jonathan Weil,
HealthSouth and Ernst Renew Flap over Fee Disclosures, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2003, at Cl.
239. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 201(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
240. Under the final rule, for example, auditors could provide certain system design and
implementation work, perform certain tax valuation, and provide internal audit work for smaller
clients. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01(c)(4)(ii)(B)(l)-(4); 210.2-01(c)(4)(iii)(B)(l)-(4); 210.2-
01(c)(4)(iv)(A)(l)-(3) (2001). The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, described at
supra note 54 and accompanying text, may exempt any person, issuer, public accounting firm, or
transaction from the prohibition on the provision of non-audit services. Such exemptions are to be
made on a case-by-case basis. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 201(b).
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committee.241 Finally, the Act added a conflict of interest provision that
prohibits a firm from conducting an audit if the chief executive officer,
controller, or chief financial officer of the issuer was employed by the
audit firm and participated in the audit of the issuer, in any capacity,
during the one year period preceding the date of the initiation of the
audit.
2 4 2
In addition to strengthening the independence requirement, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains several other provisions that directly affect
the audit function. The Act establishes a Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, which is an independent nonprofit corporation.243 The
Board is empowered with regulatory authority over private audit firms
and is to register and inspect such firms, and establish or adopt auditing,
quality control, ethics, and independence standards related to the con-
duct of audits.24  The Board consists of five members, no more than
two of which shall be or have been certified public accountants.245
Membership on the Board is full-time with five-year terms.24 6 As a con-
sequence, the audit profession will no longer be self-policing, and the
promulgation of auditing standards is no longer within the exclusive
purview of the AICPA.
In addition, the Act attempts to strengthen the role of issuers' audit
committees. 247 All audit committee members must be independent and
are precluded from accepting any consulting, advisory, or other compen-
satory fee from the issuer. Committee members also must not be an
affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary.248 Moreover, auditors
must timely disclose to the audit committee all critical accounting poli-
cies and practices, all alternative accounting treatments that have been
discussed with management, the ramifications of the use of such alterna-
241. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 201(b). The SEC recently issued final regulations implementing
the statutory rules. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4) (2003).
242. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 206. It was very common for issuers to hire, as chief financial
officers and controllers, employees of the audit firm who were assigned to the engagement. The
rationale for this practice is that such persons were familiar with the issuer's accounting practices,
procedures, and personnel and would, therefore, have less of a learning curve than other
candidates for the position.
243. The Board is not agency of the U.S. government nor shall any member or employee of the
Board be considered an officer, employee, or agent of the federal government. Id. § 101(b). The
SEC has oversight and enforcement authority over the Board. Id. § 107. The Act also established
funding sources for the Board, primarily from the collection of monetary penalties and annual
assessments of issuers. Id. § 109.
244. Id. §§ 101-105.
245. Id. § 101(e).
246. Id. §§ 101(e)(3), 101(e)(5). A member may be removed by the SEC but only for cause.
Id. § 101(e)(6).
247. The SEC and the stock exchanges have also addressed the composition and role of
issuers' audit committees. See generally Bartholomew, supra note 134, at 88-89.
248. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §301.
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tive treatments, and the treatment preferred by the audit firm.249 Mate-
rial written communication between the audit firm and management,
such as management letters and schedule of unadjusted differences, must
also be provided.2
The Act mandates that the lead audit partner or the partner respon-
sible for reviewing the audit be rotated off the engagement within five
years. 251 The Act did not mandate rotation of audit firms, but it does
require the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study
of mandatory audit firm rotation.252
It remains to be seen what effect the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will have
on the quality of the audit function. Certainly, more rigorous audit com-
mittee oversight, tightened independence rules, and the existence of an
independent watchdog are welcome. However, the Act did not disturb
the fundamental cause of auditor conflicts of interest. The issuer
remains the client. Although reducing, and perhaps eliminating, the
non-audit services the accounting firm is able to provide may mitigate
the conflict of interest, it will not eliminate it. The audit fee in and of
itself creates the conflict. Despite the fact that a single audit fee is
immaterial to firms of the magnitude of the Big Four accounting firms,
such a loss could be material for smaller firms. Moreover, loss of a
major audit client can be devastating to a partner's career in any firm
and substantially affect the operations of local offices or practice
specialties.
This Article does not suggest that the audit model should be
revised. Perhaps mandatory audit firm rotation, government paid audi-
tors, or some other such arrangement may be more effective. However,
the present model is inherently deficient if the accounting firms are to
determine, ex post, the application of accounting standards. That is pre-
cisely what they would be called upon to do in a principles-based sys-
tem. Most of the "bubble era" accounting irregularities that have come
to light in the past several years resulted in part from auditors' failures to
exercise independent judgment and take a firm stand against manage-
ment. Auditor independence, to have any substance, requires that audi-
tors be capable of acting as counterweights to the incentives
management has to make the numbers look favorable. The present
249. Id. § 204.
250. Id. A management letter is a written communication between the audit firm and the
client's management that describes operational or internal control weaknesses discovered during
the course of audit and offers suggestions for improvements. A schedule of unadjusted
differences is a summary of all accounting adjustments proposed by the audit firm but not made
because such adjustments are deemed not material.
251. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 203.
252. Id. § 207.
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model provides little assurance that, in the face of management pressure,
auditors will behave differently than they have in recent years.
(b) Managerial Incentives
The auditor-client relationship places the accounting firm in a com-
promised position. The client, after all, pays the bills, and the client, in
recent years, has had every incentive to exploit this relationship. Ironi-
cally, much of the incentive can be attributed to one particular account-
ing standard. The accounting standard for stock option compensation
has contributed to the creation of a "stock market" culture that has per-
vaded the executive suite. This culture adopts, as the ultimate objective
of management, shareholder wealth maximization as measured by the
firm's stock price. Such a culture placed tremendous pressure on public
accounting firms to comply with client wishes.
During the period 1992-2000, the median pay of chief executive
officers, in constant 2001 dollars, nearly tripled. During this period,
stock option compensation, 53 as a component of overall chief executive
compensation, increased from twenty-seven percent to fifty-one percent
and nearly quintupled in dollar terms.254 More than sixteen percent of
the shares of large firms are reserved for option exercises. 5
Stock option based compensation plans are justified by the notion
that such plans align managerial incentives with shareholder objectives,
thereby reducing the agency costs inherent in an employment relation-
ship.2 6 Whether such plans are effective has been subject to much
253. A stock option is a contract that gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to
purchase a certain number of shares of stock at a predetermined price for specified period of time.
A stock option may also grant the holder the right to sell a certain number of shares at a
predetermined price. These "put" options are not, for obvious reasons, used in compensatory
settings. The predetermined price, or strike price, can be set below, at, or above the market price
of the stock at the time of grant - in-the-money, at-the-money, and out-of-the-money,
respectively. Moreover, the option contract can be structured so that the holder captures all of a
stock's appreciation or only that appreciation over and above an established benchmark.
254. See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 847 (2002).
255. David Henry, An Overdose of Options: Depressed Stock Prices Are Prompting
Companies to Issue More Options Than Ever, Bus. WEEK, July 15, 2002, at 112. In 1980, the
average annual compensation of chief executive officers in the United States was slightly less than
$1,000,000 and virtually all of this amount consisted of traditional salary and cash bonuses. In
1998, the average annual compensation of chief executive officers ballooned to approximately
$5.5 million, almost sixty percent of which was generated by some form of equity-based pay.
Daniel Altman, How to Tie Pay to Goals, Instead of the Stock Price, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002,
§ 3, at 4 (citing several sources including Towers Perrin and Standard & Poor's ExeCucomp).
256. See Michael W. Melton, The Alchemy of Incentive Stock Options - Turning Employee
Income into Gold, 68 CoRNE.L L. Rav. 488, 495, 501-02 (1983). Other compensation
arrangements can also be used to align management's goals with those of shareholders. For
example, cash bonuses determined on some profitability metric or phantom stock plans are quite
common.
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debate, and certain attributes of stock options, as compensation vehicles,
have attracted much criticism. Critics have asserted that stock options
are valued less than optimally by their recipients and thus impose a
deadweight cost on the issuer. 7 Moreover, stock options reward their
recipients for general stock market rises and punish them for general
market declines.2 58
Stock option based compensation arrangements proliferated for
several reasons. Federal tax law limits a publicly traded corporation's
compensation deduction for salaries paid to the chief executive officer
and the four highest paid officers other than the chief executive to
$1,000,000 per officer 9.25  Excluded from this limitation is performance-
based compensation.260 Most stock option plans are deemed perform-
ance-based.26' Moreover, the recipient of stock options is generally
entitled to defer the income from the receipt of options until the options
are exercised.262 Another factor contributing to the proliferation of
stock options is the ease with which these instruments allow manage-
ment to camouflage rent-seeking behavior.263 Ineffective board of direc-
tors and inadequate shareholder protections were also contributing
factors.2 6
257. See Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding
the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options, 30 FIN. MGMT. 5 (2001), available at 2001
WL 23057973; Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33
J. Accr. EcoN. 3, 12, 15-17 (2002). The principal reason for this phenomenon is that the
recipients of the stock options are typically nondiversified.
258. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 751, 797 (2002).
259. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1)-(3) (2002).
260. Id. § 162(m)(4)(A)-(B).
261. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(iii)(C) (1995).
262. The federal income tax treatment of stock options depends on whether the options qualify
as incentive stock options and whether the recipient is subject to the alternative minimum tax.
Incentive stock options are not taxed as income to the recipient upon receipt or exercise. Instead,
the incidence of taxation is postponed until the holder sells or exchanges the underlying stock.
Gains from such sales or exchanges are taxed as capital gains. Because of several statutory
limitations, incentive stock options are not used, to any significant extent, in compensating
executives. See generally I.R.C. § 421 (2002). Nonqualified stock options are generally subject to
tax upon the exercise of the options. The income subject to tax is determined by the difference
between the option's exercise price and the fair market value of the underlying stock. See
generally Id. § 83; Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7 (1978). The alternative minimum tax may accelerate the
incidence of taxation. A fuller discussion of this tax is beyond the scope of this work. See
generally I.R.C. §§ 55-56 (2002). Whether the tax deferral on the income for the recipient of the
income provides a competitive advantage for stock option based compensation is not clear
because the corporation's compensation deduction is concomitantly deferred. See Brian J. Hall &
Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, 14 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 1, 8
(2000).
263. See generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 257, at 786-90.
264. The ability of a corporation to deduct performance-based compensation requires that such
performance-based plans be put to a shareholder vote. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2002). Moreover,
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Many of the accounting irregularities that have taken place may be
laid at the feet of stock options because they fostered a corporate culture
in which accounting irregularities were tolerated, if not encouraged.
Ironically, the accounting treatment of compensatory stock options has
contributed most to their proliferation. The standards governing com-
pensatory stock options are not particularly complex and, with a few
exceptions, criticisms have not been directed at the exploitation of
"bright-line rules." The problem is that the standards are conceptually
flawed - a plain and simple example of bad accounting.
Until the mid-1990s, generally accepted accounting principles, with
respect to compensatory stock options, required that issuing corporations
recognize compensation expense determined under the so-called "intrin-
sic value" method. 65 This method determines compensation expense as
the difference between the fair market value of the stock and the exer-
cise price at the measurement date. 66 For most stock option compensa-
tion plans, the measurement date is the date the options are granted.267
many state corporation statutes subject stock option plans to a shareholder vote as do the major
stock exchanges. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP § 505(d) (McKinney Supp. 1999). However,
shareholder approval is typically required only with respect to the broad parameters of the
compensation plan and not detailed design features. The threat of shareholder litigation is also an
ineffective mechanism for checking managerial excesses. Directors' actions are generally
protected by the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule provides legal cover for
actions undertaken in good faith and made with due care. This doctrine has found statutory
expression in Delaware with respect to stock options. "In the absence of actual fraud . . . the
judgment of the directors as to consideration for the issuance of ... options and the sufficiency
thereof shall be conclusive." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1998). Shareholders also encounter
procedural challenges. Shareholder challenges to executive compensation would come in the
form of derivative litigation. Generally, the shareholders must first make a demand on the
directors to investigate the claim and consider whether further action is appropriate. See Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984). In almost all cases, the directors, perhaps through a
special litigation committee, will seek to have the action terminated. See Randall S. Thomas &
Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 569, 576 (2001).
265. The compensation expense is recognized at the earliest date that both the number of
shares and the exercise price with respect to those shares are known with certainty. ACCOUNTING
FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD. OPINION No. 25 § 10(b) (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972). Prior to the issuance of A.P.B. Opinion No. 25,
authoritative rules for the accounting of compensatory stock options were issued in 1953. See
generally RESTATEMENT AND REvIsION OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS, ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 43, ch. 13, § B. (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1953). A.P.B.
Opinion No. 25 amended this pronouncement in part and superceded it in parts. Earlier guidance
(AccOUNTING FOR COMPENSATION IN THE FORM OF STOCK OPTIONS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
BULLETIN No. 37 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1948)) was superceded by the rules
issued in 1953.
266. ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES, supra note 264, § 10a.
267. For fixed share plans, the measurement date is the date of grant regardless of whether the
options were subject to a vesting schedule based on length of service or attainment of pre-
established performance goals. Fixed share plans are plans under which both the number of
shares subject to option and the strike price are established at the date of grant. The existence of a
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Consequently, at-the-money or out-of-the money stock options will, in
contrast to other forms of equity-based compensation, generate no com-
pensation expense for the issuing corporation.268
The growth of stock option based compensation led the FASB to
issue an exposure draft in 1993 that recommended that stock options be
recorded as compensation using fair market value models. 269 The expo-
sure draft generated tremendous controversy, and industry, particularly
technology companies, mobilized political opposition against the propo-
sal.270 In 1995, the FASB issued its final statement but the new standard
vesting period serves only to spread the resulting compensation expense over the vesting period
but does not affect the initial measurement of the expense. Id. §§ 12-14.
268. In contrast to tax accounting rules, the exercise date is largely irrelevant in the
determination of compensation expense under generally accepted accounting principles. In
general, compensatory stock options are taxable to the recipient upon their exercise, or if later,
when vested, resulting in a concomitant compensation deduction to the issuer. See I.R.C. § 83(b)
(2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7 (1978). The tax benefits generated from compensatory options can
be quite significant. See Michelle Shevlin, Accounting for Tax Benefits of Employee Stock
Options and Implications for Research, 16 AccT. HORIZONS 16 (2002) (reporting that Cisco
Systems received a tax benefit of approximately $2.5 billion in its fiscal year ended July 2000 as a
result of compensation deductions generated from the exercise of employee stock options).
269. The most prevalent valuation methods are the Black-Scholes and binomial valuation
methods. Under the Black-Scholes model, five principal variables influence the price of an
option: the current stock price; the exercise price of the option; the volatility of the stock price; the
option's time to maturity; and the risk-free interest rate. The model was developed by Fischer
Black and Myron Scholes, who published a paper in 1973 that presented the model. See Fischer
Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POLITICAL EcON.
637 (1973). An analysis of this model is beyond the scope of this work. A binomial option
pricing model establishes a portfolio of stock and options so that there is no uncertainty about the
value of the portfolio at the end of the option period and assumes a risk-free portfolio earning a
risk-free rate of return. The model also factors in the option's delta - the ratio of the change in
the price of the option to the change in the price of the underlying stock - by periodically
rebalancing the stock holdings. See generally JOHN C. TULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER
DERIVATIVES 194-207 (3d ed. 1997).
270. For example, Senator Lieberman introduced the Equity Expansion Act of 1993, which
would have mandated the SEC to prohibit the recognition of compensation expense from the
issuance of stock options. See Equity Expansion Act of 1993, S. 1175, 103d Cong. (1993).
Moreover, the proposed valuation methods stood to significantly affect the earnings of technology
companies because their stocks tend to be volatile. Oft-repeated criticisms include the assertion
that options are too problematic to value as non-cash outlays, that they do not represent an
expense, that options represent transactions with stockholders rather than expenses, and that their
issuance is reflected in the calculation of earnings per share and, consequently, are adequately
reflected in income. See, e.g., Harvey Golub, The Real Value of Options, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 8,
2002, at A12.
The medium of exchange is not relevant in the determination of whether an expense is
incurred. If an employee is compensated with a car, a house, or theater tickets, an expense will be
recognized. If such forms of non-cash compensation are appropriately recognized solely because
they can be otherwise sold for cash, while compensatory options are not recognized due to their
vesting restrictions, then such options could be used to compensate nonemployees without
recognition of expense. However, issuance of such options in consideration for the purchase of
supplies would clearly generate an expense. Moreover, premising the argument on options'
nonmarketability underestimates Wall Street's market making prowess. In fact, convertible bonds
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only encourages, but does not require, corporations to recognize com-
pensation expense using a fair market value model.2 7' Issuing corpora-
tions may continue to account for stock options under Accounting
Principles Board Opinion No. 25 provided a footnote disclosure is made
that presents the amount of compensation that would have been charged
had the options been valued under a fair value model.272 Alternatively,
corporations may recognize compensation expense upon the issuance of
compensatory stock options using an appropriate valuation model such
as Black-Scholes.273
In one respect, the accounting rules for stock options did provide a
bright-line standard that could be exploited. Corporations, under the
theory that deeply out-of-the-money options offered no incentives to
employees, often reduced the strike price of options or cancelled
existing options and reissued replacement options with a lower stock
price. The FASB recently issued an Interpretation that in general
requires corporations to recognize compensation expense upon the exer-
cise of repriced options.274 However, this rule does not apply if the
replacement options are issued more than six months after cancellation
of the options they were meant to replace.275 Therefore, corporations
can avoid the potential earnings charge by waiting six months to issue
new options - a practice that creates perverse incentives.276
are commonplace, and they may be viewed as a debt interest with an embedded call option. The
value of the option can be reasonably estimated by the interest foregone by the bondholder. See,
e.g., Floyd Norris, Legal but Absurd: They Borrow a Billion and Report a Profit, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2003, at CI (discussing a convertible bond issuance by STMicroelectronics that requires
the holder to pay the issuer one-half of one percentage point). The second point, that transactions
with stockholders do not generate expense, is accurate but only if the transaction is with a
stockholder acting in such capacity. A stockholder may act in various capacities - including as
an employee. Finally, although option shares are reflected in the earnings per share denominator,
their value should also be reflected in the numerator as a reduction of earnings. If stock is issued
to employees, the value of the stock enters into the denominator and also reduces the denominator.
No principled reason exists for treating options differently.
271. ACCouNTiNG FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOuNTING
STANDARDS No. 123 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1995).
272. Id. § 11.
273. See supra note 268.
274. ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING STOCK COMPENSATION,
INTERPRETATION No. 44 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000). An option whose exercise price is
reduced is treated as a variable plan option. As such, the appropriate compensatory measurement
point is not the date of grant but the date of exercise and, therefore, any stock appreciation that
accrues to the time of exercise will cause the corporation to recognize compensation expense. Id.
§ 39. Indirect reductions of the exercise price are also subject to this rule. For example, if a cash
bonus arrangement is instituted that is tied to the exercise of options, then the option is deemed
repriced downward to reflect the cash bonus. Id. Moreover, the cancellation of existing options,
coupled with the issuance of replacement options, is deemed to be an indirect repricing and
subject to the same rule. Id. §§ 43-45.
275. Id. § 45.
276. Because most options are issued at-the-money, executives anticipating the receipt of
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Public pressure has led many corporations to heed the FASB's
encouragement and adopt the fair value method of accounting for
options.277 Many other corporations, however, continue to resist the
pressure and echo the arguments put forth a decade ago in opposition to
the 1993 Exposure Draft.278 Moreover, those opposed to the fair value
model assert that the disclosure requirement in the 1995 standard obvi-
ates the need for expensing.279
In certain cases, companies that have opted to expense the grant of
compensatory stock options have taken steps to mitigate the charge to
earnings by employing aggressive assumptions for use in the mathemati-
cal models.28 Ironically, it is precisely at the point where a certain
amount of flexibility is provided by the standard that the manipulation is
made possible and consequently exploited. One compensation expert
succinctly captured the essence of these practices when he said,
"They're working within the system. Part of the problem is the system
probably allows them too much flexibility. ' 281 The FASB has under-
taken a major project with respect to stock based compensation and,
given the sea change in public opinion, perhaps it can resist pressures to
maintain the status quo.282
options in the near future will be inclined to favor a decline in the stock price during the
interregnum between cancellation and re-issuance.
277. In February 2002, the Ending the Double Standard for Stock Options Act was introduced
by Senators McCain and Levin, whose provisions would prohibit the tax deductibility of option
related expense if the taxpayer does not account for option-based compensation as an expense.
See S. 1940, 107th Cong. (2002). Proponents of expensing stock option based compensation were
encouraged by the requirement in international accounting standards to expense such options by
2005. See Int'l Accounting Standards Bd., IASB Update, July 2002, available at http://
www.iasc.org.uk/docs/update/upd02O7.pdf.
278. Boeing Corp. and the Washington Post Corp. have accounted for options as expenses for
years. Among the prominent corporations that have decided to join them are General Electric and
Coca-Cola. Intel, a bellwether technology company, has decided not to change its accounting for
options, however. See Don Clark, Contrary Intel Won't Expense Options, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8,
2002, at B 1; Rachel E. Silverman, GE to Expense Stock Options Held by 12% of its Employees,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2002, at A3.
279. This argument relies on the efficient market theory. The efficient market theory asserts
that the market processes all available information and, therefore, the use of options as
compensation is priced into the stock regardless of whether the cost is reflected on the income
statement or in the footnotes.
280. One of the variables in the Black-Scholes model is the volatility of the stock underlying
the option. The greater the volatility in the stock, the greater the value the model places on the
options. Some companies have, in applying this model, reduced their estimates of stock volatility,
thereby reducing the value of the options granted. See Gary Williams, Dell Joins Wave of
Companies Seeking to Soften Options Hit, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2003, at C3 (describing such
practices at Dell Computer, Genentech, Oracle, eBay, Apache, Hilton Hotels, and Stanley Works).
281. Id. (quoting Mark M. Reilly, a partner at 3C LLC, a compensation consulting firm).
282. Among the proposals that the FASB is considering is one that would allow corporations
to choose one of three methods to implement a requirement to expense stock option compensation.
Corporations could choose to expense options prospectively, whereby options granted prior to the
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Microsoft Corp. recently announced that it will no longer issue its
employees stock options and, instead, will issue employees restricted
stock. 283 The decision, based in part on employees' dissatisfaction with
stock option based compensation, is likely to prompt other corporations
to consider similar changes in their compensation strategies.2u 4 Moreo-
ver, corporations that continue to issue stock options are reducing the
amount of shares granted to employees.2 85 Some technology companies,
however, continue to buck this trend.286
Stock option based compensation has contributed to the "stock
market culture" that has pervaded corporate executive suites. A recent
study by researchers from the University of Maryland's Robert H. Smith
School of Business concluded that "[a]n environment of excessive stock
options, deteriorating financial conditions preceded by a history of
growth through acquisitions provides conditions for accounting
fraud. '287  The study examined seventy-one companies that the SEC
change in accounting method are ignored, including those not vested at the date of change.
Alternatively, corporations may elect to include in expense any options granted, but not vested,
prior to the date of change. Finally, all options could be included and prior results restated. See
FASB, Project Updates and Technical Plan, available at http://www.fasb.org/project/index.shtml
(last visited June 26, 2003). See also Robin Sidel, Three Choices Are Two Too Many for
Expensing Options, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2002, at C1. The FASB has been provided independent
funding, thereby reducing the perception that the major accounting firms exercise undue influence
in the standard setting process. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 109(e).
283. See Robert A. Guth & Joann S. Lublin, Tarnished Gold: Microsoft Ushers Out Era of
Options, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2003, at Al; John Markoff & David Leonhardt, Microsoft Will
Award Stock, Not Options, to Employees, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2003, at Al. Restricted stock is
stock issued to employees that vests either with the lapse of time, upon the attainment of certain
performance benchmarks, or both. Unlike stock options, the value of restricted stock issued to
employees requires the issuer to charge earnings for the fair market value of the shares issued. In
addition to replacing stock options with restricted stock, Microsoft has also decided to restate prior
earnings to expense stock option based compensation. See Jonathan Weil, Microsoft's Reboot:
Decision to Restate Earnings Is Unusual, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2003, at Cl. However, some
corporations are choosing to exclude the expenses associated with grants of restricted stock in the
presentation of pro forma earnings.
284. See Guth & Lublin, supra note 282, at AI0; Matt Richtel & Laurie J. Flynn, In Silicon
Valley, Pressure for Stock Grants in Lieu of Options, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2003, at C6. Stock
options have been criticized on efficiency grounds. It has been asserted that, due to most
executives' lack of diversification, stock options impose a deadweight cost on the issuer. That is,
the recipient of the stock options values such options at an amount less than the value placed on
them by the issuer. See generally Hall & Murphy, supra note 256; Meulbrook, supra note 256.
285. A sluggish job market is a significant reason for such cutbacks. See Ruth Simon,
Companies Get Stingy with Stock Options, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2003, at DI (citing surveys by
Mercer Human Resource Consulting and Sibson Consulting that found most companies surveyed
are reducing the number of stock options granted to employees).
286. See Gregory Zuckerman, Tech Companies Find Options Hard to Kick, WALL ST. J., Aug.
11, 2003, at Cl (reporting that Apple Computer, Adobe Systems, Electronic Data Systems, and
Ciena Systems, among other technology companies, recently have enabled employees to trade in
underwater options for new options exercisable at lower prices).
287. See Joann S. Lublin, Study Blames Accounting Fraud on Takeover Fever, Age of Officers,
WALL ST. J., July 3, 2003, at C4.
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prosecuted for alleged accounting irregularities between 1992 and 1999
and compared those companies with seventy-one companies in the same
industry of similar size against which no such allegations were made.
The study found that, on average, the chief executive officer of a viola-
tor company owned options valued at more than three times his salary or
bonus. 288 In comparison, the chief executives of non-violator companies
owned options approximately equal to their annual cash
compensation.289
The primacy that the shareholder wealth maximization principle, as
measured by short-term gains in the stock price, has achieved is star-
tling.29° Investment banks and brokerage houses serve, in part, as a
bridge between shareholders and management. The almost two-decade
long bull market that began in 1982 brought unprecedented influence
and celebrity to stock market analysts. The incentive infrastructure
under which Wall Street operates is underpinned by a rising stock mar-
ket, and intense pressure is exerted on management to maintain an ever-
increasing stock price. 9 1 Management, in collusion with Wall Street,
learned to manipulate the system. The incessant focus on earnings esti-
mates led companies to manage earnings. Between 1992 and 1999, the
number of companies beating earnings estimates by exactly one-cent per
share quadrupled. 92 Practices of dubious validity were accepted,
encouraged, and standardized, and Wall Street analysts, far from provid-
ing a check on these practices, had every incentive to encourage them.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. The single-minded focus on stock prices has been challenged. Various constituencies of
the firm have their own purposes, including government, consumers, labor, and suppliers. The
selection of one goal as final or ultimate requires, for legitimacy, a consensus by all
constituencies. A fortiori, such a goal will be one that is useful to all members of the firm and the
public. See Peter Koslowski, The Limits of Shareholder Value, 27 J. Bus. ETmics 137, 138
(2000). Because all members of the firm and society are consumers, the ultimate purpose of a
corporation is, arguably, to optimally produce goods or services that satisfy the needs or desires of
its customers. Id. Shareholder wealth may also be viewed as the evidentiary proof of the extent to
which the firm is achieving its goal. If shareholder wealth correlated perfectly with the firm's
principal goal, then it could be substituted, or used as a proxy, for the firm's ultimate goal.
Koslowski, however, asserts that "the price of shares in the stock market does not just reflect the
real value of the firm's productivity and performance but is also subject to mere speculation." Id.
at 141. As discussed at supra note 282, Microsoft Corp. has decided to issue restricted stock
instead of stock options. Less noticed, however, was the fact that Microsoft will determine
incentive compensation in large part based on customer satisfaction surveys. See Steve Lohr &
John Markoff, You Call This a Midlife Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003, at CI.
291. Commission-based compensation is pervasive, whether at the retail level or at the
wholesale level. Fees for investment banking services are typically determined by a percentage of
the transaction amount. Rising markets are associated with increased trading, public offerings,
and merger and acquisition activity.
292. See Jerry Useem, In Corporate America It's Cleanup Time, FORTUNE, Sept. 16, 2002, at
63, 64.
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Investment banks, aware of management's discretion to award
lucrative projects among competing firms, exerted pressure on analysts
to refrain from issuing negative reports on current or potential banking
clients.293 Moreover, the merging of commercial and investment bank-
ing functions brought pressure to bear on analysts by management
whose firms had extended loans to the companies covered by the ana-
lysts.294 "Friends and Family" initial public offering programs placed
sought-after stocks in the accounts of friendly executives.2 95
Boards of directors did relatively little to break management's
infatuation with short-term share prices. Chief executive officers often
serve on the board's nominating committee, many board members are
executives themselves and may exhibit a reticence to challenge one of
their own, and information asymmetries may also lead to board reluc-
tance to challenge management.296
293. Citigroup's Salomon Smith Barney Unit is under investigation by the New York State
Attorney General, and the investigation is primarily focused on the practices of Jack Grubman, the
unit's telecommunications analyst. Mr. Grubman maintained positive public positions on
numerous companies and, allegedly, those positions were compromised by his close ties to the
executives of firms in question or by pressure from his superiors. See Charles Gasparino, NASD
Is Preparing Civil Charges Against Salomon and Ex-Analyst, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2002, at Al;
Gretchen Morgenson, In Broker's Notes, Trouble for Salomon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, at C1;
see also Gretchen Morgenson, Analyze This: What Those Analysts Said in Private, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2002, at 1. The NASD, formerly the National Association of Securities Dealers, has also
sued Mr. Grubman and an assistant for issuing misleading research reports on Winstar
Communication, a company that eventually filed for bankruptcy. See Gretchen Morgenson,
NASD Sues Star Analyst over Research, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at Cl.
294. See Gasparino, supra note 299, at Al; see also Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, Buddy
System: How a Technology-Banking Star Doled Out Shares of Hot IPOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23,
2002, at Al (describing the practices employed by Credit Suisse First Boston and its
telecommunication analyst, Frank Quattrone). Another potential source of conflict is the fact that
many firms have exclusive contracts with a particular investment firm to manage their stock
option programs. As a consequence, the investment bank will obtain information on the amount
of shares that will be purchased or sold during a vesting period. Significant amounts of vesting
options may result in increased buy or sell volume, thereby affecting the stock price. The
investment bank's trading desk, if it traded on such information, could profit handsomely. Such
trading would be a form of illegal "front-running."
295. Underwriters of an initial public offering typically reserve a small portion of the offering
for select customers (friends) and employees of the firm offering the shares (family). During the
height of the bull market, it was not unusual in initial public offerings for the stock to close well in
excess of the offering price. In many cases, friends included executives of customers or potential
customers of the offering corporation. Allocating shares to such executives created another set of
conflicts in the sense that persons in a position to award business held stock in the companies
bidding for the business. The expectation that the share price would close well in excess of the
offering price raises the issue of whether the offering price was set too low. If so, the offering
resulted in a transfer of wealth from the corporation to the shareholders who purchased at the
offering price. The investment banks, which also serve as the offering managers, justify the initial
offering price as the optimal price with which to launch a successful offering and obtain
widespread coverage of the stock post-offering.
296. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 257, at 767-72. A noted corporate governance authority
noted:
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates enhanced audit committee inde-
pendence. 297  The Act provides a bonus-disgorgement provision,
imposes stock trading bans during pension blackout period, and requires
timelier reporting of insider transactions. 98 The Act also includes a
financial statement certification requirement and provides enhanced pen-
alties for misleading auditors.299 Otherwise, however, the Act does
nothing to address corporate governance in general or executive com-
pensation issues in particular.3" Likewise, the distribution of power
between management and shareholders has remained largely undis-
turbed. 30 1 The SEC and the stock exchanges have taken several steps in
Even if the independent directors are not actually biased in favor of insiders, the
former often are predisposed to favor the latter. Most of the learning on this
phenomenon, known as structural bias, arises out of the use of special litigation
committees to terminate shareholder derivative litigation against officers and
directors. Independent directors tend to be corporate officers or retirees who share
the same views and values as the insiders. A sense of "there but for the grace of God
go I" is the likely response to litigation against fellow directors.
See Amanda K. Esquibel, A Guide to Challenging Option Repricing, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1117,
1155 n.204 (2000) (quoting Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALl Corporate
Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1034, 1059-60 (1993)) (emphasis added).
297. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text. The increased ownership of shares by
institutional shareholders over the past two decades and the shareholders' willingness to agitate
for more effective corporate governance practices have led to an increase in the number and the
influence of independent directors both at the board and committee levels. The tenure of chief
executive officers has declined, indicating an increased assertiveness by directors. See Bebchuk et
al., supra note 257, at 773 (citing studies that report the median tenure of chief executive officers
declined from seven to five years during the period 1980 to 2000 and that the percentage of chief
executive officers with less than five years on the job has increased from forty-six to fifty-eight
percent between 1980 and 1998).
298. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §§ 304, 306, 403.
299. The principal executive officer or officers and the principal financial officer or officers
must certify in each annual or quarterly report filed with the SEC that the signing officer has
reviewed the report and that, based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any
untrue statement of material fact or omission of a material fact. Moreover, the officers certify
that, based on their knowledge, the financial statements fairly present the financial condition and
results of operations of the issuer. The certification also encompasses internal control procedures.
See id. § 302. The Act also provides criminal penalties for altering and destroying documents,
makes certain debts nondischargeable in bankruptcy, lengthens the statute of limitations period for
certain actions, enhances sentences for fraud and obstruction of justice, and provides
whistleblower protections. See id. §§ 801-806. These provisions should make fraudulent behavior
more costly but probably will have little effect on less odious practices such as aggressive
accounting. Several states have also enacted, or are considering enacting, their own version of
these and other provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Deborah Solomon, Zealous States
Shake Up Legal Status Quo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2003, at A4.
300. Significant corporate governance reforms have been put in place by, ironically,
WorldCom. As part of a settlement with the SEC, the company agreed to institute sweeping
reforms, among the most significant of which is the requirement that an outside director serve as
board chairman, and to provide mechanisms for increased shareholder participation in certain
corporate matters, including dividend policy. See WorldCom's Revenge - Radical New Ideas on
Corporate Governance, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2003, at 44-45.
301. But see Gretchen Morgenson, Shareholders Win in Effort To Alter Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
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an effort to provide shareholders with a more effective voice in certain
matters, but the effects of these steps will, in all likelihood, prove to be
marginal.3 °2
CONCLUSION
U.S. accounting standards are not without imperfections. However,
the notion that the nature of current accounting standards paved the way
for the recent round of high-profile accounting improprieties is mis-
guided. In most cases, the improprieties took place within the confines
of broad-based standards and, contrary to popular criticism, did not
involve the exploitation of rules-based, loophole-ridden standards.
Moreover, neither rules-based nor principles-based standards are inher-
ently superior or inferior to the other. The appropriateness of a particu-
lar form of standard depends on many factors. Wholesale adoption of
principles-based standards will not eliminate aggressive accounting. A
body of precedent will develop under such standards that, in all likeli-
hood, will prove at least as complex as rules-based standards and equally
27, 2003, at Cl (reporting that Siebel Systems and the Teachers Retirement System of Louisiana,
a shareholder in the company, settled a lawsuit, and under the terms of the settlement, the
company agreed to alter its executive compensation practices and provide more information to
shareholders with respect to such compensation).
302. Individual shareholders often hold shares in street name and the brokerage firm votes their
shares by proxy. The New York Stock Exchange has recently amended NYSE Rule 452, subject
to SEC approval, to prohibit firms from giving proxies on matters related to equity-based
compensation plans unless a beneficial owner of the shares has expressly given the vote to the
institution. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS REFLECTING RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
NYSE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE As APPROVED BY THE
NYSE BOARD OF DIRECTORS (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/
pdfslcorp-gov-prob.pdf. The SEC's Division of Corporation Finance recently announced that
shareholder proposals on broad-based equity compensation plans would not be excluded from
proxy statements, pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, as "ordinary business" matters. See
STAFF LEGAL BULLETIN No. 14A (Sec. & Exch. Comm. 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/
interps/legal/cfslbl4a.htm. Moreover, the SEC has required the New York Stock Exchange,
NASDAQ, and other major markets to require that listed companies' stock-based compensation
plans be approved by shareholders. See Deborah Solomon, SEC Is Set to Require Clearance by
Holders of Stock Compensation, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2003, at C7. The SEC recently announced
that it will consider proposing rules that will require the disclosure of policies and procedures used
to determine voting proxies related to portfolio securities and will make voting records available
to investors. SEC NEws DIGEST ISSUE 2002-178, Sept. 13, 2002, available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/digest/09-13.txt. Shareholder opposition to management often results in withheld votes for
management's slate of directors. Unless accompanied by public statements or other public
expression of dissatisfaction, the withholding of votes has little effect. Many institutional
investors are reluctant to disclose their votes on individual ballot questions. In a potentially
significant development, the SEC is studying proposals that would allow shareholders to place a
number of alternative directors on the ballot sent to shareholders by management in limited
circumstances. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. May Ease Voting for Outside Directors, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2003, at Cl; Floyd Norris, A Small Move to Shareholder Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, July
16, 2003, at C I.
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subject to exploitation. The present audit model places the responsibil-
ity of applying such standards - and hence the making of precedent -
on the accounting profession.
It is too soon to predict whether the legislated reforms of the
accounting profession will stiffen the profession's backbone. Perhaps,
in time, the profession can earn back the public trust it so quickly lost.
The fact that the reforms did not disturb the fundamental nature of the
client-auditor relationship justifies a healthy dose of skepticism. Mana-
gerial incentives for aggressive accounting remain in place. Incentive
compensation, whether in the form of stock options, restricted stock, or
cash, will tempt management to employ aggressive accounting to meet
whatever metric by which its performance is measured. The Economist
recently stated that "[t]argets set as triggers for incentive payments came
to suffer from what central bankers know as 'Goodhart's law,' after the
academic who noted the phenomenon: any target that is set quickly loses
its meaning as it comes to be manipulated."3 °3 Fundamental changes in
the audit model may warrant greater reliance on principles-based stan-
dards, and perhaps we are but a few high-profile scandals away from
drastic changes in the model. Until that time, however, the investing
public should take comfort in the fact that the FASB, and not the
accounting firms, sets the standards.
303. Beyond Shareholder Value, THE ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, at 7.
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